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ABSTRACT
This Article details the importance of religious freedom in the
United States and its armed forces, as well as the unfortunate history
of non-accommodation that has plagued the Department of Defense
(DoD) until recent years. It reviews the jurisprudence surrounding
military service member free-exercise claims before and after the
landmark Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, and it
analyzes how courts have addressed those claims within the military.
It proposes an analysis for handing religious accommodation claims
under RFRA in the military, and examines a series of hypotheticals
that demonstrate the issues the DoD must confront and accommodate
if it is to value its members’ religious liberty.
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I. INTRODUCTION: A TALE OF TWO SIKHS
When Ronald Sherwood enlisted in the United States (“U.S.”) Navy
in 1969, in the midst of a raging war in Vietnam, he probably hadn’t
expected his career to end in disgrace, convicted of criminal charges due
to his religious beliefs.1 He served four years honorably until, during
Thanksgiving break, he had a religious conversion and became a Sikh. 2
That decision would change the trajectory of his military service.
Sikhism – a monotheistic religion founded in India during the
fifteenth century – centers on “service, egalitarianism, and engagement in
daily life,” with Sikhs finding “markers” of their identity in “the Five Ks”:
“kesh (uncut hair which is typically covered by a turban), kanga (wooden
comb), kachha (specially-designed underwear), kara (steel bracelet), and
kirpan (strapped sword).”3 After his religious conversion, Sherwood took
the vows of the Sikh faith, including a vow where he promised that he
would not “alter his human form from the way the Creator has created it,
thereby not removing or permitting to be removed, any hair from the body,
and … wearing the unshorn hair on top of the head in a Rishi knot and
covered with a cotton cloth known as a turban.”4
Unfortunately, when Sherwood reported back to military duty, his
new religious practices directly conflicted with military uniform
regulations, which precluded the wearing of turbans.5 Unwilling to grant
an accommodation, the Navy brought criminal charges against Sherwood
at a court-martial. It convicted him of disobeying military regulations and
then discharged him from the service.6 Sherwood later sued the Secretary
of the Department of Defense (“DoD”), seeking damages and a declaration
that the regulations were unconstitutional as applied to him.7 In rejecting
his claim, an appellate court found that safety requirements for Navy
personnel constituted a compelling governmental interest and that the
Navy had used the least restrictive means in furthering that interest.8
Jumping ahead 35 years, Simratpal Singh – another young Sikh
wishing to serve in the military – faced a nearly identical dilemma to the

1

See Sherwood v. Brown, 619 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 48.
3
Jasmine K. Singh, “Everything I’m Not Made Me Everything I Am”: The
Racialization of Sikhs in the United States, 14 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 54, 55–56 (2009)
(explaining the origin and faith of Sikhism).
4
Sherwood, 619 F.2d at 48.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id. (“Whether aboard a ship or aircraft extreme conditions of confinement
make safety the touchstone of combat readiness and efficiency. . . . The
accomplishment of an entire naval mission may be impaired by the failure of a single
individual to perform his assigned task.”).
2
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one Sherwood confronted.9 Singh accepted an appointment to the United
States Military Academy at West Point in 2006, 10 but Army policy
prohibited long hair and beards. “‘[B]elieving he had no other option,’”
but feeling “‘shame and disappointment in himself,’” Singh “‘succumbed
under pressure and made the difficult decision to remove his turban, cut
his hair, and shave his beard’” so that he could serve in the Army. 11 He
graduated from West Point with honors and served as an Army Ranger,
receiving several medals, including a Bronze Star for his service in
Afghanistan, and attaining the rank of Captain – all the while not
maintaining the articles of his faith.12 In 2015, after meeting Sikh soldiers
who had received accommodations for their faith, Singh told his
commander that he would begin wearing a turban, unshorn hair, and a
beard despite the fact that this conflicted with uniform regulations.13 While
the Army considered how to handle Singh’s situation, it granted him a
series of temporary religious accommodations.14
Eventually, Singh sued the Army in federal court and obtained a
temporary restraining order allowing him to maintain the articles of his
faith despite the uniform regulations.15 The district court judge agreed that
the Army “unquestionably has a compelling interest in ensuring the health
and safety of military personnel,” but found that it had failed to use the
“least restrictive means” to further that interest, partly because it had
“granted permanent religious accommodations in the past to other Sikh
soldiers [who had] . . . served with merit on active duty deployments.”16
Singh’s case eventually settled, and he continued to serve, while the DoD
modified its regulations to accommodate the needs of Sikh and other
religious military members.17

9

See Singh v. Carter, 168 F. Supp. 3d 216, 220 (D.D.C. 2016).
Id.
11
Id. Ironically, the Army had previously categorically exempted Sikhs from its
uniform and appearance regulations from 1958 until 1981, when it changed its policy
because of requests for exemptions from other groups, and due to concerns about the
fitting of gas masks over beards. See Khalsa v. Weinberger, 779 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th
Cir.), aff’d, 787 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985) (declining to review a Sikh’s challenge to
Army appearance regulations preventing his enlistment due to judicial deference to
military policies).
12
See Singh, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 220.
13
See id. at 220–21.
14
See id. at 221.
15
See id. at 222.
16
Id. at 230−31.
17
See Corey Dickstein, Army Grants Religious Exemptions For Beards,
Turbans, And Hijabs, STARS & STRIPES, (Jan. 8, 2017, 5:21 PM),
https://taskandpurpose.com/news/army-grants-religious-exemptions-beards-turbanshijabs/ []; see, e.g., DOD INSTRUCTION 1300.17, Religious Liberty in the Military
Services, (Sept. 1, 2020) (expanding discretion to grant uniform accommodations).
10
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Religious servicemembers like Sherwood and Singh have always
been present in the armed forces, providing valuable aid in the military’s
primary mission to fight and win wars.18 So why the difference in
treatment and outcome in these two cases, one litigated in the 1970s and
the other in the 2000s? One major reason is the impact of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”),19 passed in 1993 but only recently
finding its footing in the DoD’s regulations. One might say the military
has been “born again” into the RFRA world Congress created in the
1990s.20 But will this conversion last?
This Article details the history of religious liberty cases in the U.S.
Armed Forces, both before and after RFRA’s passage and eventual
acceptance by the DoD, and it poses a series of contemporary
hypotheticals to test whether the military’s newfound RFRA conversion
will persevere. Part II recounts the importance of religion to the founding
generation and to servicemembers over the centuries. Part III sets out the
trajectory of religious liberty cases prior to the passage of RFRA, as well
as the military’s reluctance to accommodate religious free exercise in its
policies. Part IV discusses the birth of RFRA in 1993, and its evolution
over the past 25 years. Part V traces the military’s failure to embrace
RFRA within military regulations until 2014, and the judicial avoidance
of the Act in military cases. Finally, Part VI proposes a series of
hypotheticals – derived from the headlines and dealing with religion in the
workplace, LGBTQ+ issues, and the Covid-19 pandemic – that are testing
the resolve of the DoD to tolerate the religious beliefs of its members in
the midst of a rapidly shifting cultural landscape. This Article concludes,
however, that the DoD can and should respect the religious beliefs and
practices of military members, as RFRA requires, while staying true to
recent social change.

II. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: A FREEDOM WORTH FIGHTING FOR
Religion and religious liberty have always served an essential role in
society and culture, making them necessary ingredients for good

18
See Dickstein, supra note 17 (“Sikhs fought in the Army during both World
Wars, the Korean War and in Vietnam[.]”); see generally Rajdeep Singh Jolly, The
Application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to Appearance Regulations
That Presumptively Prohibit Observant Sikh Lawyers from Joining the U.S. Army
Judge Advocate General Corps, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 155 (2007) (discussing the Sikh
uniform issue in depth under RFRA).
19
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141,
107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4) invalidated by City of
Borne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
20
See John 3:3−5 (stating that only those who are “born again” may enter God’s
kingdom).
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democratic government and a strong military.21 As Founding Father John
Adams predicted, the U.S. Constitution would only be successful if it
governed “a moral and religious people.”22 The same can be said of a
successful armed forces, where integrity, service, and honor are required
to avert the worst atrocities of warfare.23 Part II of this Article briefly
addresses the historic importance of religion at the founding of the nation
and in the lives of military members.

A. Religion in the Colonial Militia and at the Founding
Perhaps no individual had a greater influence in shaping the U.S.
military than George Washington, its first Commander-in-Chief.24 Even
while serving as a young colonel during the French and Indian War
(1753−63), he recognized the importance of religious practice within the
armed forces, repeatedly requesting chaplains for his troops to preserve
“[c]ommon decency … in a camp.”25 When his superiors refused his
requests, Washington periodically performed those religious duties
himself: reading the Scriptures, offering prayers, and conducting funeral
services.26
In the lead-up to American Revolution, Colonial leaders understood
that human rights and civil freedoms had developed in Western
Civilization largely due to religious principles.27 They recognized that
Leon Miller, Religion’s Role in Creating National Unity’, 26 INT’L J. ON
WORLD PEACE 91, 96 (2009) (discussing the view that “the cornerstone of liberty is
religious freedom.”).
22
Letter from John Adams to the Officers of the First Brigade of the Third
Division of the Militia of Massachusetts (Oct. 11, 1798).
23
See Sandra Gibson, The Code of Honor; Know it; Embrace it, U.S. ARMY
(Mar.
8,
2013),
https://www.army.mil/article/98038/the_code_of_honor_know_it_embrace_it
[https://perma.cc/BM3Q-4PVD].
24 See Brian Logan Beirne, George vs. George vs. George: Commander-inChief Power, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 267–69 (2007).
25 GEORGE WASHINGTON, THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON Vol. II 178
(John C. Fitzpatrick, ed.) (1931). Washington made at least six pleas for chaplains
during his military tenure. Id. at Vol. I 498, 505, 510; Vol. II 33, 56, 178.
26 See, e.g., JARED SPARKS, THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON Vol. II
54 (1834); E. C. M’GUIRE, THE RELIGIOUS OPINIONS AND CHARACTER OF
WASHINGTON 136 (1836); WASHINGTON IRVING, LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON Vol.
I 128−129, 201 (1855); C. M. KIRKLAND, MEMOIRS OF WASHINGTON 155 (1857); J.
T. HEADLEY, THE ILLUSTRATED LIFE OF WASHINGTON 60 (1859).
27 See JHH Weiler, Freedom of Religion and Freedom From Religion: The
European Model, 65 ME. L. REV. 759, 767 (2013) (noting that human rights “do not
only derive from the Enlightenment, Neo-Kantianism, and the French Revolution,”
but that they also have “always drawn” from religious sources); see Aaron R. Petty,
Religion, Conscience, and Belief in the European Court of Human Rights, 48 GEO.
21
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religion deals with universal values to which humanity has always attained
in seeking relationship with a “divine or transcendent authority.”28 Indeed,
this understanding was an underlying premise in the revolutionary mind,
as seen in the Declaration of Independence’s famous statement that, “[a]ll
men are created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights.”29
During the American Revolution, those involved with the defense of
a new nation also understood the importance of religion.30 After the
Battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill, Congress established the
Continental Army, recommending “all officers and soldiers diligently to
attend Divine Service.”31 Congress similarly instructed its fledgling navy
that “commanders of the ships of the Thirteen United Colonies are to take
care that Divine Service be performed twice a day on board, and a sermon
be preached on Sundays.”32
With independence achieved, the Constitution’s framers included a
key religious protection in the founding document: that “no religious test
shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under
the United States.”33 This provision prevented bigotry against minority
(mostly Christian) religions in filling public offices.34 Later, when the first
Congress debated the Bill of Rights, it rejected the notion that it should
broadly protect all conscience rights, opting instead to single out religious
belief for “preferential treatment.”35 The First Amendment’s final draft
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 807, 816–17 (2016) (recounting Christianity’s role in developing
human rights in Europe).
28 Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional
Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 218 (1991); see also MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED
AND THE PROFANE (1957) (discussing the universal aspects of the divine throughout
human history); Thomas C. Berg, Can State-Sponsored Religious Symbols Promote
Religious Liberty?, 52 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 23, 30 (2013) (“A transcendent source
means that the rights apply to everyone, even those who seem most alien, and that
society must take the utmost care when it treads close to these rights.”).
29 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
30 James P. Byrd, Was the American Revolution a holy war?, WASH. POST (July
5, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/was-the-american-revolution-aholy-war/2013/07/05/039fb5b8-e25f-11e2-aef3-339619eab080_story.html
[https://perma.cc/KH2Q-KY5B].
31 UNITED STATE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, ET. AL., JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS Vol. II 112 (1904).
32
Id. at Vol. III, 378.
33 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
34 Daniel L. Dreisbach, The Constitution's Forgotten Religion Clause:

Reflections on the Article VI Religious Test, 38 J. CHURCH & STATE 261, 262 (1996).
35 See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
400 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Eduardo Peñalver, The Concept of
Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 802–03 (1997) (citing “compelling” evidence that the
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protected religion as the nation’s “first freedom,” declaring in the Religion
Clauses that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”36 The first part of that
sentence is known as the “Establishment Clause,” while the second part is
known as the “Free Exercise Clause.”37

B. Religion and the Armed Forces in a Growing, Diverse Nation
“Those who adopted our Constitution … believed that the public
virtues inculcated by religion are a public good.”38 This can be seen
through actions taken by the first Congress, such as its passage of
legislation recognizing that “religion, morality and knowledge” were
“necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind.”39 That
same Congress also saw the benefit of acknowledging religion in public
institutions, passing a law that provided for the payment of legislative
chaplains, which the Supreme Court recognized as constitutional.40 Since
that time, Presidents and Congresses of all parties have acknowledged the
importance of religion in public life,41 including in the armed forces. In

Framers rejected a version of the Religion Clauses that would have covered secular
conscience rights); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1481–82 (1990)
(same).
36 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
37 Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts on behalf of the Federal Judiciary,
First Amendment and Religion, UNITED STATES CTS. (last visited Feb. 7, 2022),
https://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/educational-activities/firstamendment-and-religion [https://perma.cc/6JVP-RCHL].
38
Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 400 (Scalia, J., concurring). But see McCreary
Cty. v. Am. C.L. Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 878–79 (2005) (disputing Scalia’s
position).
39
See Act of Aug. 7, 1787, 1 Stat. 50 (1789) (“An Act to provide for the
Government of the Territory Northwest of the river Ohio”) (reenacting the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, which contained the quoted language in its text).
40
See JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 67 (1820); Act of Sept. 22, 1789, 1 Stat. 70 (1789) (“An Act for allowing
compensation to the Members of the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States, and to the Officers of both Houses”); see also Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783, 792–93 (1983) (citing the first Congress’s appointment of legislative
chaplains as a valid, constitutional historical practice, while upholding the practice of
legislative prayer in Nebraska).
41
See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring); see
also McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 885–912 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 91–114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that a city’s inclusion of a nativity scene in its
Christmas display did not violate the establishment clause, “notwithstanding the
religious significance” of the nativity scene). See generally Zorach v. Clauson, 343
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one remarkable decision from 1892, the Supreme Court catalogued the
“Christian” foundations of the nation from Colonial days to the present,
declaring that every state had demonstrated “a profound reverence for
religion, and an assumption that its influence in all human affairs is
essential to the well-being of the community.”42
A similar notion impacted how religion was integrated into the U.S.
Armed Forces from the very beginning. America’s second Commanderin-Chief, John Adams – known as the “Father of the American Navy” –
instructed his Secretary of the Navy on the importance of a Navy
chaplaincy: “I know not whether the commanders of our ships have given
much attention to this subject [chaplains], but in my humble opinion, we
shall be very unskillful politicians as well as bad Christians and unwise
men if we neglect this important office in our infant navy.”43 Congress
responded favorably to President Adams’ desire by establishing and
providing for naval chaplains, and re-issuing the naval regulations it had
established during the Revolutionary War, requiring Divine Services twice
each day aboard all naval vessels, and a sermon each Sunday.44 This
continued the longstanding acceptance of organized (Christian) religion in
military life, acknowledging the importance for service members to freely
participate in religious exercise.45 Indeed, in every branch of the military,
the chaplaincy has continued unabated to the present day, and has been
found to be constitutional as an accommodation for military members to
exercise their religion.46
Unfortunately, as with the rest of U.S. society, members of minority
religions living in a “Christian nation” did not find full acceptance in the
U.S. Armed Forces until recently. For instance, during the Civil War, over
3,000 chaplains served in both the Union and Confederate armies, yet the
U.S. 306, 312–14 (1952) (detailing the for religion’s accepted role in official
government actions).
42
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 469 (1892).
43
JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS Vol. VIII, 661−62 (Charles
Francis Adams, ed.) (1853) (quoting a letter to Benjamin Stoddert, the Secretary of
the Navy, on July 3, 1799).
44
Act of Apr. 23, 1800, 2 Stat. 45 (1800) (“An Act for the better government of
the navy of the United States”).
45
See generally Ronit Y. Stahl, How the US military embraced America’s
religious
diversity,
MILITARY
TIMES
(Nov.
12,
2019),
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/11/12/how-the-us-militaryembraced-americas-religious-diversity/
[https://perma.cc/TM2X-4V43]
(“The Continental Congress . . . authorized military chaplains to minister to soldiers
in 1775 . . . [t]he armed forces have employed clergy ever since . . . [and they are
now] fully integrated into the military’s organizational structure.”).
46
See, e.g., Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 237 (2d Cir. 1985) (upholding the
chaplaincy). See generally Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Instruments of
Accommodation: The Military Chaplaincy and the Constitution, 110 W. VA. L. REV.
89 (2007) (analyzing chaplaincy as an accommodation).
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Chaplain Corps was dominated overwhelmingly by Methodists.47 The
Union Army originally required that its chaplains be from a Christian
denomination, although in 1862 it finally allowed rabbis to serve Jewish
military members.48 Later, when the United States entered World War I
in 1917, the military chaplaincy was once again entirely Christian in
composition until Congress passed a law expanding its composition,
naming eligible religions for the chaplaincy to include Jews, Mormons,
Christian Scientists, the Eastern Orthodox and the Salvation Army. 49
Since that time, the chaplaincy has continued to grow and diversify.
Today, chaplains of many diverse religions can be found in the
military, including Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists. 50 They “care for all
Service members, including those who claim no religious faith, facilitate
the religious requirements of personnel of all faiths, provide faith-specific
ministries, and advise the command.”51 They not only serve the spiritual
needs of members, but also distinguish themselves in warfare.52 The best
known modern example may be the “grunt padre,” Father Vincent
Capodanno, a Navy chaplain awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor
after he was killed in action in Vietnam as he “moved about the battlefield
administering last rites to the dying and giving medical aid to the wounded
… [and] provided encouragement by voice and example to the valiant
marines.”53 One of only nine chaplains to receive the Medal of Honor,
Father Capodanno had a Navy frigate named in his honor,54 and the Roman

Rachel Williams, Civil War Chaplains, NAT’L MUSEUM OF CIVIL WAR MED.
(Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.civilwarmed.org/chaplains/ [https://perma.cc/DR9ZVPVP].
48
See id.
49
See, e.g., Jim Dao, Atheists Seek Chaplain Role in the Military, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr.
27,
2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/us/27atheists.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&
[https://perma.cc/3LKQ-YLKA] (discussing the diversity of the modern chaplain
corps).
50
See generally RONIT Y. STAHL, ENLISTING FAITH: HOW THE MILITARY
CHAPLAINCY SHAPED RELIGION AND STATE IN MODERN AMERICA (2017) (detailing
the “processes through which the military struggled with, encouraged, and regulated
religious pluralism over the twentieth century”); see also Stahl, supra note 45.
51
OPNAV INSTRUCTION 1730.7D, Religious Ministry Within the Department of
the Navy, para. 5(e)(3) (Aug. 8, 2008).
52
Id.
53
Stories of Sacrifice, CONG. MEDAL OF HONOR SOC’Y,
https://www.cmohs.org/recipients/vincent-r-capodanno
[https://perma.cc/7XUP79T4] (last visited Mar. 3, 2022). Father Capodanno’s recommendation for a Bronze
Star for service while he was still alive included the detail that he “encouraged the
men of all faiths to do more for their God, our Country, their corps and themselves.”
ANN BALL, FACES OF HOLINESS II, 255 (2001).
54
Katie Lange, Medal of Honor Monday: Navy Lt. Vincent Capodanno, DEP’T
OF
DEF.
(Apr.
1,
2019),
47
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Catholic Church has opened up a cause for his potential canonization as a
saint.55
The importance of religion to service members was again illustrated
in the World War II era. In the build-up to the war, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt vowed to “never fail to provide for the spiritual needs of our
officers and men.”56 During the war, Roosevelt directed (at government
expense) the printing and distribution of the Bible to troops, along with his
exhortation, “I take pleasure in commending the reading of the Bible to all
who serve in the Armed Forces of the United States.”57 In a major survey
following the war, the Army discovered that soldiers most frequently
identified prayer as their strongest source of support during combat.58 And
in 1950, as post-World War II America slid into Cold War with the Soviet
Union, President Harry S. Truman convened a commission that focused
on chaplains and spiritual faith in the military. 59 The commission found
that the West’s “idea of a moral law[,] which is based on religious
convictions and teachings,” gave “democratic faith a very large measure
of its strength” compared to those totalitarian regimes that rejected the
moral law and stifled religion.60
The preceding anecdotes merely sample the hundreds of historical
examples illustrating that the practice of religion within the armed forces
is an important right, and that the religious liberty of service members is
worth preserving. Even in the modern military, which is more religiously

https://www.defense.gov/Explore/Features/story/Article/1798399/medal-of-honormonday-navy-lt-vincent-capodanno/ [https://perma.cc/NV26-AYYV].
55
Progress on Cause for Canonization, FATHER CAPODANNO GUILD (May 23,
2017),
https://www.capodannoguild.org/progress-cause-canonization/
[https://perma.cc/3WEU-PXAC].
56
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Oct.
12,
1942),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/fireside-chat-4
[https://perma.cc/9FC5-X9A5].
57
CLIFFORD M. DRURY, THE HISTORY OF THE CHAPLAIN CORPS: UNITED STATES
NAVY 9 (1948).
58
See SAMUEL A. STOUFFER ET AL., STUDIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN WORLD
WAR II Vol II, 136 (1949) (discussing the survey results by the Army’s Information
and Education Division).
59
Hans Zeiger, Why Does the US Military Have Chaplains?, PEPPERDINE SCH.
PUB.
POL’Y,
https://publicpolicy.pepperdine.edu/academics/research/policyreview/2009v2/why-does-us-military-have-chaplains.htm [https://perma.cc/9QPZ9FHT].
60
THE MILITARY CHAPLAINCY: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE
PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON RELIGION AND WELFARE IN THE ARMED FORCES 1–2
(Oct. 1, 1950) (“A program of adequate religious opportunities for service personnel
provides an essential way for strengthening their fundamental beliefs in democracy
and, therefore, strengthening their effectiveness as an instrument of our democratic
form of government.”).
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diverse than ever,61 religious liberty is still cherished by most service
members.62 Unfortunately – as the following sections demonstrate – the
right of religious liberty is an ideal that has not always been realized by
civilian and military leadership or vindicated in the courts. To the
contrary, the modern history of religious accommodation in the U.S.
Armed Forces has largely been one of military leaders reluctantly
following the lead of Congress in response to decisions by the Supreme
Court that have been viewed as devaluing the importance of religious
freedom.

III. IN THE BEGINNING: PRE-RFRA FREE-EXERCISE CASES
Prior to passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”)
in 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts – including
military courts – applied differing standards in religious-liberty cases,
often curtailing the free exercise of religion in favor of public safety or
military efficiency. Part III of this Article first discusses the varied tests
the Supreme Court erected in cases involving the Free Exercise Clause,
which eventually led Congress to adopt a single standard under RFRA. It
then examines how the military addressed religious liberty during the preRFRA period.

A. Pre-RFRA Supreme Court Precedent in Civilian Cases
The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the Free Exercise
Clause as a “tightly closed” door “against any government regulation of
religious beliefs,”63 which receive absolute protection under the
Constitution. Religious exercise and actions, however, have been subject
to the whim of inconsistent judicial standards.64 For instance, the Court’s
prevailing view for many years was that “Congress was deprived of all
legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions
which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.”65
61
In 2009, the DoD conducted a Religious Identification and Practices Survey
(RIPS), which revealed that 65.84% of military members claim some type of Christian
identity and 25.5% claim no religious affiliation, with the remaining 9% reporting a
variety of non-Christian faiths. See Issue Paper #22, Religious Diversity in the U.S.
Military, MILITARY LEADERSHIP DIVERSITY COMMISSION 3 (2010).
62
The RIPS also found that a substantial majority of those surveyed claimed that
religion was either “important” or “very important” in their lives. Id. at 4.
63
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)).
64
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1879).
65
Id. at 164; see also Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341–42 (1890) (upholding
laws against bigamy and polygamy, and distinguishing religion from the “form of
worship of a particular sect,” finding that it would “shock the moral judgment of the
community” to accept polygamy as “a tenet of religion”).
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Yet in 1943, the Court struck down a law requiring recitation of the Pledge
of Allegiance each school day because it unconstitutionally infringed upon
the free exercise of religion by members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses.66
The deciding factors in free-exercise cases often have been the directness
of a law’s burden on religious practice and its neutrality toward religion.67
In the 1961 case of Braunfeld v. Brown,68 the Supreme Court
considered a challenge to state “blue laws,” which required businesses to
remain closed on Sundays even though this disproportionately impacted
businesses run by Orthodox Jews, who typically observe Saturday as their
sabbath.69 In upholding such laws with an “indirect” impact on religion,
the Court set a relatively low bar for the government, finding that a
“general law” passed “to advance the State’s secular goals” (such as
mandating a single day where families could spend time away from the
rigors of commerce), would be “valid despite [the law’s] indirect burden
on religious observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by
means which do not impose such a burden.”70 Thus, the State could justify
actions that indirectly burdened religious exercise if it could merely
demonstrate a secular purpose and that no alternative, non-burdensome
means could accomplish that purpose.
Just two years later, the Supreme Court signaled a paradigm shift in
its landmark decision in Sherbert v. Verner,71 involving a member of the
Seventh-Day Adventist church – which also observes a Saturday sabbath
– who was denied unemployment benefits after she was terminated from
her job because her beliefs prevented her from working on Saturdays.72
Finding a violation of the Free Exercise Clause, the Court applied a more
exacting standard than the one used in Braunfeld.73 After Sherbert, if a
claimant could prove that a state action placed a substantial burden on her
ability to act on her sincere religious beliefs, then the government was
required to satisfy “strict scrutiny” in the courts by showing that it was
acting in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and had used
the least restrictive or burdensome means to achieve that interest.74
For nearly three decades after Sherbert, courts often applied strict
scrutiny in free-exercise cases, such as in Wisconsin v. Yoder,75 where the

66

See generally West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).
68
Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
69
Id. at 601.
70
Id. at 607.
71
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
72
See id. at 403–04.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (rejecting the government’s
argument that the Free Exercise Clause only protected religious belief, not actions
such as going to school).
67
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Supreme Court granted Amish families a religious accommodation from
state compulsory school requirements because of the law’s substantial
burden on their religious practices and unique way of life.76 During the
1980’s, however, the Supreme Court began moving away from the
Sherbert standard in some free-exercise cases.77
Finally, in 1990, the Court overhauled its jurisprudence altogether in
another landmark unemployment case, Employment Division v. Smith.78
There, the Court limited Sherbert’s reach in a case where members of the
Native American Church in Oregon were fired from their jobs and denied
state unemployment benefits for misconduct due to their illegal ingestion
of the hallucinogenic drug, peyote, which is commonly used sacramentally
by some Native American tribes.79 The Oregon law that prohibited the use
of peyote and other controlled substances did not target drugs that are used
sacramentally, and it applied equally to everyone within the state.80 The
Court expressed concern that applying Sherbert’s strict scrutiny test to
such neutral laws of general applicability “would be courting anarchy …
[and] would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious
exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”81
Instead, the Court affirmed the convictions and held that neutral laws of
general applicability that incidentally burdened religion would be
analyzed under the rational basis test in the future.82 While this holding
did not detract from the Court’s precedent in Braunfeld, it significantly
undermined the Sherbert and Yoder precedents.83
Smith received swift and severe criticism from both sides of the
political spectrum.84 As discussed in Part IV, the case directly led

76

Id. at 236.
See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982) (upholding social
security taxes, stating that “some religious practices yield to the common good” in “an
organized society that guarantees religious freedom to a great variety of faiths”);
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (refusing to apply strict scrutiny to freeexercise cases in the armed forces because of the unique nature of military service);
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 702 (1986) (upholding social security numbers, stating
that “claims of religious conviction do not automatically entitle a person to” relief
because “not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional”).
78
Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
79
Id. at 878.
80
See id.; OR. REV. STAT. § 475.922(4) (1987).
81
Smith, 494 U.S. at 888–89 (listing in jeopardy compulsory military service
laws, tax laws, child neglect laws, drug laws, minimum wage laws, child labor laws,
“animal cruelty laws, environmental protection laws, and laws providing for equality
of opportunity for the races”).
82
See id. at 878.
83
Id. at 893–903 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the
Majority’s interpretation of these precedents)
84
See infra Section IV.A.
77
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Congress to pass RFRA in an attempt to restore strict scrutiny as the
applicable legal test in religious-exercise cases.

B. Pre-RFRA Military Treatment of Religious Liberty
The Supreme Court has consistently noted that the Free Exercise
Clause embraces the freedom both to believe and to act, but while the
former is absolute, the latter is not.85 This principle has been especially
true within the armed forces, particularly after World War II, as America’s
armed forces grew more religiously diverse.86 Inevitably, conflicts arose
between a greater variety of religious tenets and the demands of military
service.87 Although military courts frequently applied legal tests that were
analogous to the tests applied in civilian cases, they also acknowledged
that the unique nature of military service sometimes yielded different
results than in the civilian world.88
For instance, in the 1954 case of United States v. Morgan,89 a member
of the Jehovah’s Witnesses faith refused to obey his commander’s order
to salute the flag and other superiors due to his religious belief that a salute
constituted idolatry.90 The airman was criminally tried and convicted at
court-martial for willfully disobeying the lawful commands of his superior
officer.91 On appeal, the United States Air Force Board of Review –
predecessor to the current Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals –
summarily rejected Morgan’s free-exercise claim despite the Supreme
Court’s recognition only a few years earlier that it was unconstitutional to
force a Jehovah’s Witnesses member to salute the flag and recite the
Pledge of Allegiance in school.92 The Air Force court distinguished the
Supreme Court precedent due to the unique nature of military service.93 In
a similar case three years later, the Air Force court again upheld the courtmartial conviction of a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses faith for failing
to salute.94 The court noted that the member had voluntarily enlisted in
the service, thereby subjecting himself to military regulations, as well as
Id. at 894 (O’Connor, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
86
Kevin L. Walters, Beyond the Battle: Religions and American Troops in
World War II (2013) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kentucky) (on file with History
at UKnowledge, University of Kentucky).
87
See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940).
88
Walters, supra note 86.
89
United States v. Morgan, 17 C.M.R. 584 (A.F.B.R. 1954).
90
Id. at 586.
91
See id.
92
Id. at 587; see West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
93
See Morgan, 17 C.M.R. at 587 (“It follows, of course, that those subject to
military discipline are under many duties and may not claim many freedoms that we
hold inviolable as those in civilian life.”).
94
United States v. Cupp, 24 C.M.R. 565, 575 (A.F.B.R. 1957).
85
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that the regulations were “not intended to interfere with religious liberties”
(i.e., they were neutral toward religion).95
With no relief coming from the courts, the following three decades
saw no notable military free-exercise cases. Indeed, the notion that the
military had a free hand to limit the rights of servicemembers under the
First Amendment was buttressed by the Supreme Court’s 1974 decision,
Parker v Levy,96 which upheld the court-martial conviction of an Army
doctor who refused to follow orders due to his conscientious objection to
the Vietnam War.97 In that case, the Court acknowledged that “members
of the military are not excluded from the protection granted by the First
Amendment”; however, it cited the “different character of the military
community and … mission” that required “the fundamental necessity for
obedience[] and … imposition of discipline,” making it “permissible
within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible
outside it.”98 In the wake of Parker, the military services continued to
handle religious-accommodation requests through their own internal
policies.99
In the 1980’s, a new wave of military free-exercise litigation arose,
this time in federal civilian courts.100 An early key decision – already
discussed in the introduction to this Article – involved Ronald Sherwood’s
conversion to Sikhism and his prosecution for refusing to cut his hair and
remove his turban.101 In his post-service challenge to his discharge, the
Ninth Circuit applied Sherbert-style strict scrutiny to the military’s
uniform regulations, yet it upheld the Navy’s actions, finding that the
military had used the least restrictive means to further its compelling
interest in the safety of its personnel.102 The court noted that “extreme”
military conditions “make safety the touchstone of combat readiness and
efficiency,” and that a Sikh’s inability to wear a helmet “poses serious

Id. at 571−72.
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
97
Id. at 736.
98
Id. at 758.
99
Not all these policies were detrimental to religious liberty. For instance, the
Army crafted a policy in 1958 that categorically exempted Sikhs from uniform and
appearance regulations, until it reversed that policy in 1981. See Khalsa v.
Weinberger, 779 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 787 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985).
100
Bill Kenworthy, Military Speech, FREEDOM F. INST. (Feb. 2010),
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-ofspeech-2/personal-public-expression-overview/military-speech/
[https://perma.cc/S746-YHK4].
101
Sherwood v. Brown, 619 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Khalsa, 779 F.2d
at 1395 (declining review of a Sikh’s challenge to Army appearance regulations due
to judicial deference).
102
Sherman, 619 F.2d at 48.
95
96
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safety problems both for the unprotected sailor and for the crew that
depends on him.”103
Two years after Sherwood’s case, the Air Force took an even harder
line in Bitterman v. Secretary of Defense,104 where an Orthodox Jewish
airman brought an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of an Air
Force uniform regulation. Conceding that wearing a yarmulke would not
interfere with Bitterman’s duties as an air traffic controller, the Air Force
argued instead that its regulations furthered two compelling interests: (1)
“the effective functioning and maintenance of the Air Force,” and (2)
“motivation, image, morale, discipline, and esprit de corps.”105 The
district court agreed and gave the military remarkable deference, finding
that the regulations were the least restrictive means to further a compelling
interest in “maintaining an efficient Air Force.”106 Even more
extraordinary, the court opined that Bitterman’s desire to wear a yarmulke
was not a religious requirement, but merely a “preference.”107 This notable
finding contradicted the usual judicial practice of avoiding questions about
the centrality of a particular religious practice or exercise to a religious
system of belief.108
This new wave of military free-exercise cases prompted Congress to
commission a joint service study on religious matters as part of the DoD
Authorization Act of 1985.109 Incredibly, this was the first time the DoD
had made a thorough examination of the types of conflicts “that religious
practices can pose for service members, the military interests at stake when
these conflicts arise, and possible accommodations.”110 The report found
four areas of recurring religious conflict: diet, health, dress and
appearance, and “time off to observe worship, sabbath, or holy days.”111
The study advised against mandating the accommodation of religion

103

Id.
Bitterman v. Sec’y of Def., 553 F. Supp. 719, 720 (D.C. 1982).
105
Id. at 724.
106
Id. at 724–25.
107
Id. at 726 (citing 1 GERISON, APPEL, THE CONCISE CODE OF JEWISH LAW 34,
n.3 (1977) (permitting Jews to not wear yarmulkes, “especially where one’s livelihood
is involved”)).
108
See, e.g., Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
887 (1990) (“Judging the centrality of different religious practices is akin to the
unacceptable business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims.”);
Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (“It is not within the judicial ken to
question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith.”); Fowler v. Rhode Island,
345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) (“[I]t is no business of courts to say that what is a religious practice
or activity for one group is not religion under the protection of the First Amendment.”).
109
Major Thomas R. Folk, Religion and the Military: Recent Developments, THE
ARMY LAWYER (DA PAM 27-50-156) 6, 7 (Dec. 1985) (discussing the background of
the newly released DoD report and regulations).
110
Id.
111
Id. (quoting DOD DIRECTIVE 1300.17 (Mar. 1985)).
104
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because the “nature of the military requires servicemembers to subordinate
individual desires or beliefs to military mission and discipline.” 112 Still,
those findings led military leaders to adopt DoD Directive 1300.17, which
– though advisory in nature to avoid undermining military discipline with
legally enforceable rights – for the first time provided military religiousaccommodation guidance.113
In 1986, the Supreme Court finally took up a military free-exercise
case, Goldman v. Weinberger,114 revisiting the issue of whether a Jewish
servicemember was entitled to a free-exercise accommodation to wear a
yarmulke while on duty.115 Presaging its holding in Smith four years later,
the Court ruled that the First Amendment rights of an Orthodox Jew and
ordained rabbi who served in the Air Force were not violated by being
prohibited from wearing a yarmulke while indoors and on duty.116 The
decision resolved the confusion in the lower courts over whether strict
scrutiny should be applied in military free-exercise cases.117 Noting once
again that “the military is . . . a specialized society separate from civilian
society,” and that judicial review of military actions must be “far more
deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations
designed for civilian society,”118 the Court applied a much more
government-friendly standard than strict scrutiny, holding that the
regulation at issue reasonably and even-handedly regulated attire in a
manner that accomplished the military’s need for uniformity and
discipline.119
In the wake of Goldman, Congress took action – not for the last time
– to correct a perceived injustice by the Supreme Court, dictating by statute
that “a member of the armed forces may wear an item of religious apparel
while wearing the uniform of the member’s armed force,” and directing
the DoD to prescribe regulations consistent with the law. 120 Complying,
the military revised DoDD 1300.17 in February 1988, affirming that “a
Jewish yarmulke may be worn with the uniform … as long as it does not
interfere with the proper wearing, functioning, or appearance” of required
headgear.121 The regulation announced the “policy that requests for
Id. (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Def., Joint Service Study (May 20, 1985)).
Id. (quoting DOD DIRECTIVE 1300.17 (Mar. 1985)).
114
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
115
Id. at 504.
116
Id. at 509–10.
117
See Goldman v. Sec’y of Def., 530 F. Supp 12 (D.C. 1981); Goldman v. Sec’y
of Def., 734 F.2d 1531, 1535–36 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (disagreeing over the proper level
of judicial scrutiny).
118
Weinberger, 475 U.S. at 506−07.
119
See id. at 510.
120
See Pub.L. 100-180, Dec. 4, 1987, 101 Stat. 1086 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §
774(a), (b)); see also Dwight H. Sullivan, The Congressional Response to Goldman
v. Weinberger, 121 MIL. L. REV. 125 (1988).
121
DOD DIRECTIVE 1300.17, para. 3.2.7.3 (Feb. 3, 1988) (now superseded).
112
113
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accommodation of religious practices should be approved by commanders
when accommodation will not have an adverse impact on military
readiness, unit cohesion, standards, or discipline.”122 But it also set out
five factors for commanders considering a religious accommodation: (1)
“[t]he importance of military requirements in terms of individual and unit
readiness, health and safety, discipline, morale, and cohesion”; (2) [t]he
religious importance of the accommodation to the requester”; (3) “[t]he
cumulative impact of repeated accommodations of a similar nature”; (4)
“[a]lternative means available to meet the requested accommodation”;
and, (5) “[p]revious treatment of the same or similar requests.” 123 Finally,
it specified that, in appropriate cases, commanders could take
administrative actions against those seeking accommodations, including
“assignment, reassignment, reclassification, or separation.”124
But even as the military reluctantly revised its regulations in
response to statutory requirements, the Supreme Court considered Smith,
which would strip strict scrutiny review from most free-exercise cases in
the nation.125 Soon, Congress would again need to use whatever powers it
possessed to protect religious liberty.126

IV. THE PASSAGE AND INTERPRETATION OF RFRA
For those seeking to “re-birth” the Free Exercise Clause in the watery
wake of the Supreme Court’s controversial decisions in Goldman and
Smith, the spirit of politics would be their salvation with passage of
RFRA.127 Part IV of this Article first addresses the near-unanimous
support for RFRA in 1993, followed by the Act’s first serious setback at
the Supreme Court in 1997. It then examines how the courts have
interpreted the scope and reach of RFRA, separately examining each
aspect of a RFRA claim.

A. RFRA’s Birth and Initial Setback
In the wake of Smith, a miraculously bi-partisan coalition of
politicians and organizations – many with historically conflicting agendas
– rallied to reinstitute the Sherbert standard in free-exercise cases.128
122

Id. at para. 3.1.
Id. at para. 4.1.1−4.1.5.
124
Id. at para. 4.3.
125
See Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 873 (1990).
126
See Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4) invalidated by City
of Borne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
127
Id.
128
For example, the American Civil Liberties Union, Traditional Values
Coalition, Christian Legal Society, and the American Jewish Congress all expressed
123

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

19

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 2 [], Art. 6

454

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

Congressman Chuck Schumer, a Democrat from New York, introduced
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 129 which was met with
such universal acclaim that it unanimously passed the House of
Representatives and missed unanimous passage in the Senate by only three
votes before President William J. Clinton signed it into law.130
The chief aim of RFRA was to restore strict scrutiny as the legal
framework for analyzing free-exercise claims under the First
Amendment,131 and by the Act’s own terms, it achieved that goal (and
much more). Under RFRA, when the government imposes a substantial
burden on sincere religious exercise, it must demonstrate that its actions
constitute the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling state
interest.132 The Act demands a particularized inquiry; the balancing test
must be “satisfied through application of the challenged law ‘to the person’
– the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being
substantially burdened.”133
As originally written, RFRA applied at both the federal and state
levels, restoring strict scrutiny as the applicable legal test across the
nation.134 Almost immediately, however, its constitutionality was
challenged on federalism grounds as an overreach of Congress’s remedial
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.135 In 1997, the
Supreme Court agreed with that position in City of Boerne v. Flores,136
holding that “Congress had overstepped its Section 5 authority because
‘[t]he stringent test RFRA demands’ ‘far exceed[ed] any pattern or
practice of unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause as
interpreted in Smith.’”137 This holding negated the application of the Act
to the states; nearly half of the states have gone on to pass their own statelevel versions of RFRA in the wake of City of Boerne.138

support for RFRA. See DAVID M. ACKERMAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 97-795A, THE
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT OF 1993 20–22 (1998).
129
Pub. L. No. 103-141, invalidated by City of Borne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997).
130
All Information (Except Text) for H.R. 1308 – Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/housebill/1308/all-info [https://perma.cc/4NP5-DYJV] (last visited Feb. 6, 2022).
131
See ACKERMAN, supra note 128, at 20−22.
132
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 692 (2014).
133
Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
430−31 (2006) (quoting § 2000bb–1(b)).
134
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4.
135
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997).
136
Id. at 511.
137
Burwell, 573 U.S. at 695 (discussing City of Boerne’s holding).
138
See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01 (1999);
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-123-401–16-123-407 (2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571b
(1993); FLA. STAT. §§ 761.01–761.061 (1998); IDAHO CODE § 73-402 (2000); 775 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 35/1–99 (1998); IND. CODE § 34-13-9 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
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The Court later found that Congress had acted within its proper
authority in passing the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), which (like RFRA) applied strict scrutiny to
free-exercise cases arising in both federal and state prisons.139 The Court
also made it clear that RFRA did not pose constitutional concerns as
applied to purely federal acts (such as those actions taken by authorities
within the U.S. Armed Forces).140 In short, despite the concerns raised in
Smith about strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court began to faithfully interpret
and apply RFRA in the way Congress intended.141

B. RFRA’s Interpretation and Evolution
The Supreme Court has discussed or directly applied RFRA in
several cases in the new millennium, expounding on the broad protections
for religious liberty contained in the Act.142 The Court has explained that
Congress amended RFRA to provide “even broader protection for
religious liberty than was available” under pre-Smith decisions like
Sherbert and Yoder,143 and that RFRA protects religion “far beyond what
this Court has held is constitutionally required.”144 As the cases have
evolved at both the Supreme Court and in lower courts, questions about
RFRA have arisen in three primary areas: the definition of religion under
the Act, the substantial burden required to trigger strict scrutiny, and the
mechanics of applying RFRA’s strict scrutiny when it is triggered.145

446.350 (2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.350 (West 2013); LA. STAT. ANN. §§
13:5231–5242 (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-61-1 (2014); MO. REV. STAT. § 1.302
(2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-22-1–5 (2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §§ 251–258
(2000); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2401–2408 (2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-80.1-1–4
(1993); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-32-10–60 (1999); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 4-1-407 (2018);
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 110.001–.012 (West 1999); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 57-2.02 (2022).
139
See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713–14 (2005) (upholding a facial
challenge against RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2000)).
140
See Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418, 430–31 (2006) (discussing RFRA).
141
See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 713–14.
142
See, e.g., Burwell, 573 U.S. at 696.
143
Id. at 695 n.3. The Court explained this expansion by noting that RLUIPA
amended RFRA’s definition of “exercise of religion” in a manner that “deleted the
prior reference to the First Amendment” in “an obvious effort to effect a complete
separation from First Amendment case law.” Id. at 695−96, 714.
144
Id. at 706.
145
See discussion infra Sections B.1, B.2, B.3.
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1. The Meaning of “Religion” Under RFRA
Although not explicitly set forth in the Act, to qualify for protection
under RFRA (or RLUIPA), a religious belief must be “sincere.”146 This is
because an insincere “belief” is no religious belief at all. The Supreme
Court has explained that, in passing those two laws, Congress believed
“that the federal courts were up to the job” of “spotting” and “dealing with
insincere … claims” in religion cases.147 Thus, insincere religious beliefs
are not protected by RFRA.148 The Court has also stated, however, that it
would be inappropriate for the government to judge the reasonableness or
plausibility of a sincerely held religious belief.149 A court’s “narrow
function” is to determine whether the asserted belief reflects “‘an honest
conviction’” by the person asserting it.150 But exactly what beliefs qualify
as “religious” under RFRA?
Neither RFRA nor the Constitution define the scope of “religion,”
leaving it to the courts to sort out. Courts and legal scholars have struggled
to define the parameters of “religion” in the Constitution’s requirement
that Congress neither establish a religion nor infringe on its free
exercise.151 The Framers of the First Amendment viewed religion as
purely theistic in nature,152 encompassing Christianity and other faiths that
recognized the existence of a God. The Supreme Court has sent mixed
signals on the issue. At one point, the Court unanimously used theistic
terms in adopting a definition of religion as “reference to one’s views of
his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence
for his being and character, and of obedience to his will.”153 Beginning in
146
See Burwell, 573 U.S. at 718. But c.f. Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000bb–2000bb-4) invalidated by City of Borne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
147
Burwell, 573 U.S. at 718.
148
See id.
149
See id. at 724–25 (citing Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990)); Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Thomas v. Rev.
Bd. of Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969)).
150
Id. at 725 (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716).
151
See Antony Barone Kolenc, Not “For God and Country”: Atheist Military
Chaplains and the Free Exercise Clause, 48 U.S.F. L. REV. 395 (2014) (discussing
the meaning of “religion” in the First Amendment).
152
See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 313, 338 (1996) (agreeing the Framers viewed “religion” as theistic); Peñalver,
supra note 35, at 803 (noting “religion” encompassed theistic beliefs for Framers);
Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1405
(2012) (“There is little, if any, evidence that the Framers, ratifiers, or ordinary
members of the public understood the meaning of religion to encompass nontheistic
views.”).
153
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) (discussing the Mormon church
and polygamy); see also United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 625 (1931) (“We

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol87/iss2/6

22

Berry and Kolenc: Born-Again RFRA: Will the Military Backslide on its Religious Con

2022]

THE RFRA AND THE MILITARY

457

the mid-twentieth century, however, the Court began to use the term
“religion” to include a wide variety of faiths, including non-theistic ones
and even secular humanism.154 Yet the Court has still maintained as a core
principle that the First Amendment’s scope of religious belief requires
some quality to distinguish it from purely secular beliefs and philosophies,
which are not covered by the Religion Clauses.155
As the twentieth century progressed, courts and legal scholars
developed more sophisticated approaches to define the meaning of
religion. One accepted approach uses a multi-factor test that identifies
“instances to which the concept [of religion] indisputably applies” and
then compares “in more doubtful instances how close the analogy is
between these and the indisputable instances.”156 Alternatively, a useful
single-factor test – the “Higher Reality” approach – posits that the most
essential aspect of religion is “faith in something beyond the mundane
observable world – faith that some higher or deeper reality exists than that
which can be established by ordinary existence or scientific
observation.”157 This latter approach seems to fit better with the Framers’
view of religion, which also centered around the concept of a Creator.158
While the meaning of “religion” under the First Amendment is an
important question, RFRA is no longer tied to the Supreme Court’s freeexercise cases interpreting that amendment.159 Although the Act originally
made reference to the “exercise of religion under the First Amendment” in
its definitions section, when Congress passed RLUIPA it sought “to effect
a complete separation [of RFRA] from First Amendment case law” by
“delet[ing] the reference to the First Amendment [in RFRA] and defin[ing]
the ‘exercise of religion’ to include ‘any exercise of religion, whether or
are a Christian people, according to one another the equal right of religious freedom,
and acknowledging with reverence the duty of obedience to the will of God.”).
154
See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961) (noting that
“[a]mong religions in this country which do not teach what would generally be
considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture,
Secular Humanism and others”); see also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165
(1964); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (interpreting the definition of
religion in the Universal Military Training and Service Act “to exclude essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical views”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53
(1985) (noting the Court had “unambiguously concluded that the … First Amendment
embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at all”).
155
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (“A way of life … may
not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based
on purely secular considerations; to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the
claims must be rooted in religious belief….”).
156
Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L.
REV. 753, 763 (1984).
157
Id. at 805.
158
Peñalver, supra note 35, at 803.
159
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 696 (2014) (citing §
2000cc–5(7)(A)).
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not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.’”160 Still,
many considerations that go into defining religion under the First
Amendment also apply to identifying RFRA’s scope of religion. 161
For instance, in United States v. Meyers, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit explained that a party asserting a RFRA claim must
identify state actions that “(1) substantially burden, (2) a religious belief
rather than a philosophy or way of life, (3) which belief is sincerely
held.”162 In Meyers – a pre-RLUIPA case – a criminal defendant accused
of crimes involving marijuana raised a RFRA defense, testifying “that he
is the founder and Reverend of the Church of Marijuana and that it is his
sincere belief that his religion commands him to use, possess, grow and
distribute marijuana for the good of mankind and the planet earth.”163 The
lower courts rejected his claim, finding that it was sincerely held but that
it did not qualify as “religion” under RFRA.164 The courts used a multifactor approach to define religion, considering such factors as whether the
proposed marijuana religion included “comprehensive beliefs” containing
“ultimate ideas,” “metaphysical beliefs,” or a “moral or ethical system,”
and whether it had the “accoutrements of religion” (such as a divine
founder, “important writings,” “gathering places,” “keepers of
knowledge,” “ceremonies and rituals,” “structure or organization,”
“holidays,” “diet or fasting,” “appearance and clothing,” and a way to
propagate its beliefs).165 The Tenth Circuit found that “Meyers’ beliefs
more accurately espouse a philosophy and/or way of life rather than a
‘religion.’”166
Even after RFRA’s changes under RLUIPA, courts continue to use
similar multi-factor tests to determine whether certain beliefs are
“religious” under the Act.167 This is so because Congress still has not
defined the scope of the term “religion.”
160

Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1482 (10th Cir. 1996).
162
Id.
163
Id. at 1479.
164
Id. at 1483−84.
165
Id.
166
Id. at 1484. Notably, Meyers is a pre-RLUIPA case that references the
Supreme Court’s First Amendment case law; however, the Tenth Circuit has not
repudiated this approach even after RLUIPA’s redefinition. See generally id.
167
See, e.g., Hale v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 759 Fed. Appx. 741, 746 (2019). In
Hale, the Tenth Circuit rejected a claim by a prisoner who identified himself as “‘a
minister in The Church of the Creator,’” which has the “overriding mission” of the
“permanent prevention of the cultural, genetic, and biological genocide of the White
Race worldwide and thus the achievement of White racial immortality.” Id. at 743. In
rejecting the belief system as a “religion,” the court noted, for example, that, “[i]nstead
of addressing existential, teleological, or cosmological matters, Creativity presents
only a singular concern of racial dominance, framed in terms of social, political, and
ideological struggles.” Id. at 747.
161
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2. Substantial Burdens in RFRA Cases
By its terms, RFRA prohibits the federal government (including
military authorities) from placing a “substantial burden” on religious
exercise without a compelling justification.168 Early on, this language led
some courts to opine that RFRA would only protect religious exercise that
was “central” to the religion’s belief system.169 In 2000, however,
Congress remedied that ambiguity by amending the Act and removing any
potential requirement for centrality.170 RFRA now defines “religious
exercise” to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled
by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”171 The Supreme Court has
acknowledged this revised definition.172
Unfortunately, RFRA also does not define what constitutes a
“substantial burden” to a person’s ability to engage in religious exercise.173
Nor has the Supreme Court provided specific guidance on what makes a
burden more or less substantial,174 although the Court has held that forcing
a person to choose between religious exercise and “serious disciplinary
action” constitutes a substantial burden, 175 as does forcing a person to
choose between acting in accordance with religious beliefs and paying “an
enormous sum of money” as a fine.176
Some courts apply a common-sense approach to understanding the
meaning of “substantial,” giving the term its “ordinary” or “natural”
meaning.177 The Tenth Circuit has given more guidance in this area by
establishing a test to determine when a burden on religion becomes
substantial enough to trigger RFRA strict scrutiny. This test – essentially

168
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141,
107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4) invalidated by City of
Borne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
169
See Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 567 n.34 (5th Cir. 2004).
170
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (2000) (“As used in this chapter . . . the term
‘exercise of religion’ means religious exercise, as defined in section 2000cc-5 of this
title.”).
171
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(a).
172
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 696 (2014) (citing §
2000cc–5(7)(A)).
173
See United States v. Sterling, 75 M.J. 407, 417 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
174
In Burwell, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that the modifier
(“substantially”) was meant to “carry weight” because it was inserted into the bill
“pursuant to a clarifying amendment offered by Senators Kennedy and Hatch,” and
that Kennedy had stated the law “‘does not require the Government to justify every
action that has some effect on religious exercise.’” 573 U.S. at 758 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
175
Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 361 (2015).
176
Burwell, 573 U.S. at 726.
177
Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1226 (11th Cir.
2004).
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adopted by the DoD today178 – occurs when the government, “at the very
least”:
(1) requires the plaintiff to participate in an activity prohibited by a
sincerely held religious belief, (2) prevents the plaintiff from
participating in an activity motivated by a sincerely held religious
belief, or (3) places considerable pressure on the plaintiff to violate a
sincerely held religious belief—for example, by presenting an illusory
or Hobson’s choice where the only realistically possible course of
action available to the plaintiff trenches on sincere religious
exercise.179

Additionally, some courts go beyond the subjective explanation
given by the religious person, further inquiring “objectively” whether the
government “actually ‘puts’ the religious adherent to the ‘choice’ of
incurring a ‘serious’ penalty or ‘engaging in conduct that seriously violates
his religious beliefs.’”180

3. The Application of Strict Scrutiny Under RFRA
Under RFRA, government actions that substantially burden religious
exercise are subject to an exacting kind of judicial scrutiny.181 As it turns
out, RFRA scrutiny is perhaps even more demanding than the strict level
of scrutiny previously set forth by the Supreme Court in Sherbert, which
RFRA sought to restore.182 Not only might it be difficult for government
authorities to articulate interests that are sufficiently compelling, but they
might not be able to demonstrate that they have taken the least restrictive
means to further those interests.
As an initial point, once a person claiming protection from RFRA has
shown that the challenged government action would substantially burden
a sincere religious exercise, the government bears the burden of
demonstrating that its interests are sufficiently compelling.183 This
requires, as RFRA itself states, that the government show “that application
178
See DOD INSTRUCTION 1300.17, Religious Liberty in the Military Services,
para. G.2 (Sept. 1, 2020) (adopting the Tenth Circuit’s definition for the DoD when
defining “substantial burden”).
179
Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 55 (10th Cir. 2014).
180
Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 818 F.3d 1122, 1144 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Holt, 574 U.S. at 361).
181
See Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4) invalidated by City
of Borne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
182
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 706 (2014 (opining that
RFRA protects religion “far beyond what this Court has held is constitutionally
required”).
183
See Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418, 429 (2006) (discussing the burden in RFRA cases).
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of the [substantial] burden to the person … is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest.”184 In interpreting the Act’s language,
the Supreme Court has emphasized that the compelling-interest inquiry is
“focused” and not “categorical” in its approach, and that the government
must demonstrate that its compelling interest can only be satisfied by
applying the challenged law to the “particular claimant” whose exercise is
being substantially burdened.185
For example, while discussing the first prong of strict scrutiny in O
Centro Espírita, the Supreme Court rejected a categorical argument by the
government against a member of a sect with a religious exercise that
involved consuming a hallucinogenic tea prohibited by the Controlled
Substances Act (“CSA”).186 The government argued that it had “a
compelling interest in the uniform application of the [CSA] such that no
exception . . . could be made to accommodate the sect’s sincere religious
practice.”187 Not persuaded, the Court cited the fact that the government
had previously granted an exception to the CSA for religious use of peyote
by “hundreds of thousands of Native Americans practicing their faith.”188
Thus, the government’s argument failed on the first prong of strict scrutiny
because it could not establish that there was a compelling interest in
applying the CSA to the particular tea-drinking religious claimants in the
case.189
The least-restrictive-means analysis under RFRA may be even more
difficult to satisfy than the compelling-interest inquiry. As the Supreme
Court explained, “[t]he least-restrictive-means standard is exceptionally
demanding,” requiring that the government show “that it lacks other means
of achieving its desired goal without imposing a substantial burden.”190
Further, “if a less restrictive means is available for the Government to
achieve its goals, the Government must use it.”191 This test is exceedingly
difficult for the government to satisfy.
For instance, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Supreme
Court struck down the oft-maligned contraceptive coverage mandate
184

Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141,
107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4) invalidated by City of
Borne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
185
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 430−31 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(b) and noting
that “RFRA expressly adopted the compelling interest test ‘as set forth in Sherbert …
and … Yoder,” where the “Court looked beyond broadly formulated interests
justifying the general applicability of government mandates and scrutinized the
asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants”).
186
Id. at 423.
187
Id. at 423.
188
Id. at 433.
189
See id. at 439.
190
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 728 (2014).
191
Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 364–65 (2015) (quoting United States v.
Playboy Ent. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000)).
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contained in the Affordable Care Act of 2010.192 The Court assumed
arguendo that the government had a compelling interest in ensuring
women cost-free access to contraceptives, but it concluded the mandate
was not the least restrictive means of furthering that interest under RFRA
because the government had failed to demonstrate that it had no other
means at its disposal of achieving its stated goal.193 A year later, in Holt
v. Hobbs, the Supreme Court applied RLUIPA – which mandates the same
kind of strict scrutiny as RFRA – to a state prison policy that prohibited
inmates from growing beards.194 The Court invalidated the policy in part
because applying it to a particular Muslim inmate without accommodation
was not the least restrictive means of satisfying the prison’s safety
concerns − an ostensibly compelling interest.195 These prison concerns are
the same types of concerns Congress considered for the military, also.196

V. RFRA’S APPLICATION WITHIN THE U.S. ARMED FORCES
As this Article discussed in Parts I to III, the history of
accommodation of religious exercise in the military has been mixed, even
while servicemembers have cherished their faith and chaplains have
ministered to their spiritual needs. Typically, military leaders have
focused more on unit efficiency and uniformity than individual religious
liberty, adjusting DoD policies only after Congress forced their hand.197
After RFRA’s passage and success at the federal level, as discussed
in Part IV, one would think the Act would have had a major impact on the
U.S. Armed Forces, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s concern in
Smith that applying strict scrutiny to neutral military service laws “would
be courting anarchy … [and] would open the prospect of constitutionally
required religious exemptions … of almost every conceivable kind.”198 In
fact, the opposite occurred.199 Part V first traces the military’s forced,
overly delayed embrace of RFRA from its passage in 1993 until 2020,
when the DoD’s regulations finally recognized the full spirit and letter of

192

Burwell, 573 U.S. at 736.
Id. at 728−29.
194
See Holt, 574 U.S. at 364−65.
195
Id. But see Adams v. Comm’r, 170 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting
taxpayer RFRA claim opposing military funding because implementing the tax system
in a uniform, mandatory way was the least restrictive means of furthering the
government’s compelling interest in collecting taxes).
196
See H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 8 (1993) (likening military interests to
institutional prison interests).
197
See discussion supra Parts I–III.
198
Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888−89
(1990) (worrying that applying strict scrutiny would put “military service laws” in
jeopardy).
199
See discussion infra Parts V.A, V.B.
193
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the Act. It then discusses the generally weak response in courts that
considered RFRA claims in military cases.

A. The DoD’s Long, Unpardonable Delay in Embracing RFRA
With RFRA’s passage, the DoD faced another opportunity to adjust
military policy to the will of Congress, as it reluctantly did in the 1980’s.200
That change, however, was inexcusably slow in coming.201 For decades
after 1993, the military operated as though RFRA either did not exist or
did not change how commanders must address religious-liberty issues
among its ever-diversifying pool of recruits.202

1. The DoD’s Willful Ignorance of RFRA
For twenty years after RFRA’s passage, the DoD largely ignored the
Act, despite official positions acknowledging its constitutionality. 203
Although RFRA’s text does not explicitly mention the military, there is no
doubt it applies fully to the acts of military leaders and commanders, as
the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (“CAAF”) recognized in
2016.204 RFRA leaves no wiggle room, applying to actions by the
“government,” which it defines as any “branch, department, agency,
instrumentality, official (or other person acting under color of law) of the
United States.”205 Further, its legislative history expressly contemplated
military application.206 The House Judiciary Committee’s report on the
Act stated that, “[p]ursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the
courts must review the claims of … military personnel under the
compelling governmental interest test.”207 Similarly, the Senate Judiciary
Committee’s report stated that, “[u]nder the unitary standard set forth in
the act, courts will review the free-exercise claims of military personnel
under the compelling governmental interest test.” 208 As early as 1997, a
200

See infra notes 120–26 and accompanying text.
See infra Part V.A.1.
202
See infra Part V.A.1.
203
See infra. n. 203–221 and accompanying text.
204
See United States v. Sterling, 75 M.J. 407, 410 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (“RFRA[]
… applies in the military context.”).
205
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2 (2000).
206
H.R. REP. NO. 103-88 (1993).
207
Id.
208
S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 12 (1993). But see Jeffrey Lakin, Atheists in
Foxholes: Examining the Current State of Religious Freedom in the United States
Military, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 713, 729–30 (2011) (arguing RFRA’s legislative
history is mixed because the House Committee did not “necessarily” believe RFRA
would undermine military authority, and the Senate Committee “intend[ed] and
expect[ed]” the “significant deference” that “the courts have always extended to
military authorities” to “continue under” RFRA).
201
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United States district court found that RFRA applied to military orders and
regulations.209
The fact that RFRA’s passage was a non-event to DoD leaders is
illustrated by the Act’s absence in any regulations and legal analysis in
military circles. For instance, in a lengthy 1998 article written by an Army
judge advocate in The Army Lawyer – an article purporting to provide “a
legal framework for judge advocates to use to ensure that their commands
neither improperly restrict the free exercise of religion, nor
unconstitutionally establish religion” 210 – RFRA was nowhere discussed
or applied, receiving a single mention in a footnote that erroneously
suggested the Supreme Court had “held that the RFRA was
unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress’ legislative powers.”211
The article relied instead on outdated DoD and Army religiousaccommodation regulations that had not been modified since 1988 or 1993
(pre-RFRA), concluding that “religious accommodation issues are
leadership issues rather than legal ones” because the regulations “are
settled” that a commander has “great latitude to make a decision” and
should “accommodate religious practice unless the mission requires
otherwise.”212
Three years later, an article about RFRA written by a judge advocate
in an official publication by the Office of the Air Force Judge Advocate
General summed up the RFRA situation in military legal circles as of
March 2001:
Although the act was passed in 1993, there is an absence of guidance
within the department incorporating the compelling interest test. In
fact, as recently as February 2001, guidance available was to follow a
1988 DOD Directive … which uses a rational basis test even though
the directive itself is hopelessly outdated. What regulatory guidance
there is does not incorporate the test mandated by Congress in 1993.213

The article referenced guidance from the Air Force JAG Corps that
had been “recently changed” to reflect the RFRA test (although not in any
formal regulation), and it noted that the position of the Departments of
Justice and the Air Force had been that RFRA was constitutional. 214
See Rigdon v. Perry, 962 F. Supp. 150, 160−61 (D.D.C. 1997).
Major Michael J. Benjamin, Justice, Justice Shall You Pursue: Legal Analysis
of Religion Issues in the Army, ARMY LAW., Nov. 1998, at 18.
211
Id. at 2 n.4 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (finding
RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states, not that it was unconstitutional as
applied to the federal government)).
212
Id. at 8−13.
213
Major Calvin Anderson, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 28 NO. 1
THE REPORTER 10, 10 (2001).
214
Id. (citing ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICES, AIR FORCE GENERAL
LAW DIVISION (AF/JAG), (Mar. 5, 2001)).
209
210
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Despite this official determination, the military had not yet incorporated
the Act’s mandates into its guidance to commanders and legal advisors.215
Remarkably, although the article had stated that legal advisors should
consider the possibility of applying RFRA to religious accommodation
requests, it concluded, “Absent more specific regulatory guidance,
commanders should continue to apply existing [outdated] regulations to
religious accommodation requests.”216
In fact, it was not until 2009 that the DoD canceled its 1988 guidance
and replaced it with an updated regulation.217 Incredibly, the new
instruction completely ignored RFRA and failed to even hint at
incorporating the compelling-interest or least-restrictive-means standards
required by RFRA.218 Instead, the instruction merely reissued the same
1988 DoD policy that “requests for accommodation of religious practices
should be approved by commanders when accommodation will not have
an adverse impact on mission accomplishment, military readiness, unit
cohesion, standards, or discipline.”219 In dealing with accommodations for
“religious apparel,” the guidance limited that definition to “[a]rticles of
clothing worn as part of the doctrinal or traditional observance of the
religious faith,” explicitly excluding from the definition “[h]air and
grooming practices required or observed by religious groups.” 220 It also
reissued the same five factors for commanders to consider for religious
accommodations that had been included in the 1988 regulation, as well as
the guidance that administrative actions could be taken against those
requesting accommodations where the requests were “not in the best
interest of the unit, and continued tension between the unit’s requirements
and the individual’s religious beliefs is apparent.”221
Thus, despite the discussion in the 2001 Air Force JAG article,
military leaders in 2009 seemed to believe that RFRA did not apply to the
military. With DoD displaying this untenable position by regulation, the
stage was set for further congressional action.

215

See id.
Id. at 12.
217
See DOD INSTRUCTION 1300.17, Accommodation of Religious Practices
Within the Military Services (Feb. 10, 2009) (now superseded).
218
See generally id.
219
Id. at para. 4.
220
Id. at para. 3(b).
221
Id. at Enclosure.
216
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2. The DoD’s Long-Overdue Embrace of RFRA
In 2014, military leadership would once again be prompted to
recognize religious liberties through congressional intervention.222 In the
National Defense Authorization Acts for 2013 and 2014, Congress
directed the DoD to issue regulations enhancing protections for the
religious exercise of conscience by servicemembers and chaplains.223
While complying with this direction, on January 22, 2014 – over twenty
years after the passage of RFRA – the DoD finally incorporated the Act
into official regulatory guidance.224 One of the amendments to the DoD
regulation appropriately defined the “exercise of religion” to include “any
religious practice(s), whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system
of religious belief.”225 The changes also included as part of religious
exercise the “grooming and appearance practices, include hair, required or
observed by religious groups,” even including “religious body art” and
piercings.226
Significantly, the 2014 change incorporated RFRA’s “substantial
burden” requirement, defining the burden as “significantly interfering with
the exercise of religion as opposed to minimally interfering with the
exercise of religion.”227 It restated RFRA’s requirement that a religiousaccommodation request “from a military policy, practice, or duty that
substantially burdens a Service member’s exercise of religion may be
denied only when the military policy, practice, or duty: (a) Furthers a
compelling governmental interest [; and] (b) Is the least restrictive means
of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”228 While the
regulation did not define what constituted the “least restrictive means,” it
did define a “compelling governmental interest” as “a military requirement
that is essential to accomplishment of the military mission.”229 It went on
to declare that the DoD had a compelling interest “in mission
accomplishment, including … military readiness, unit cohesion, good
order, discipline, health, and safety, on both the individual and unit levels.
An essential part of unit cohesion is establishing and maintaining uniform
222
See DOD INSTRUCTION 1300.17, Accommodation of Religious Practices
Within the Military Services (Feb. 10, 2009) (Incorporating Change 1, Effective
January 22, 2014) (now superseded).
223
See § 533, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L.
No. 112-239; § 532, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub.
L. No. 113-66.
224
See DOD INSTRUCTION 1300.17, Accommodation of Religious Practices
Within the Military Services (Feb. 10, 2009) (Incorporating Change 1, Effective
January 22, 2014) (now superseded).
225
Id. at para. 3(f).
226
Id. at para. 3(c), (d).
227
Id. at para. 3(e).
228
Id. at para. 4(e)(1).
229
Id. at para. 3(g).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol87/iss2/6

32

Berry and Kolenc: Born-Again RFRA: Will the Military Backslide on its Religious Con

2022]

THE RFRA AND THE MILITARY

467

military grooming and appearance standards.”230 The regulation gave
additional in-depth guidance on how commanders should process
accommodation requests, mostly restating the prior 1988 guidance (with
some modification), and still leaving open the possibility that a member
requesting an accommodation could be administratively reassigned,
reclassified, or separated from the service.231
On September 1, 2020, the DoD canceled its 2009/2014 instruction
and reissued a newly revised and reorganized instruction that mostly
repeated the prior guidance from 2014, with some substantive changes.232
Five changes are worthy of particular note. First, the new instruction
clarified that in religious accommodation requests, “the burden of proof is
placed upon the DoD Component, not the individual requesting the
exemption.”233 Second, it required that accommodation requests “be
reviewed and acted on as soon as practicable, and no later than the
timelines provided in Table 1,” placing strict 30−60 day deadlines on
decisions.234 Third, an added factor attempted to address the leastrestrictive-means analysis, stating that decisionmakers should consider
“[a]lternate means available to address the requested accommodation. The
means that is least restrictive to the requestor’s religious practice and that
does not impede a compelling governmental interest will be
determinative.”235 Fourth, it stated that granted accommodations “will
remain in effect during follow-on duties, assignments, or locations, and
for the duration of a Service member’s military career, including after
promotions, reenlistment or commissioning, unless and until rescinded in
accordance with the requirements of this issuance.”236 Fifth, it provided a
specific explanation of what constitutes a “substantial burden,” defining
that as an act that “[r]equires participation in an activity prohibited by a
sincerely held religious belief; [p]revents participation in conduct
motivated by a sincerely held religious belief; or [p]laces substantial
pressure on a Service member to engage in conduct contrary to a sincerely
held religious belief.”237
With these 2020 changes to the DoD’s regulations, the military had
finally embraced the full import of the spirit and letter of RFRA.

230

Id. at para. 4(c).
See id. at para. 4, Enclosure.
232
See DOD INSTRUCTION 1300.17, Religious Liberty in the Military Services
(Sept. 1, 2020).
233
Id. at para. 1.2(e).
234
Id. at para. 3.2(c).
235
Id. at para. 3.2(d).
236
Id. at para. 3.2(g).
237
Id. at para. G.2 (definitions). This definition seems largely taken from the
Tenth Circuit’s decision Yellowbear decision. See Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d
48, 55 (10th Cir. 2014). This three-pronged approach seems a reasonable and prudent
way to capture the RFRA burden, even for military members.
231
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B. The Mixed Judicial Response to RFRA in Military Cases
Military leaders were not the only ones struggling to determine
whether, when, and how to apply RFRA to cases involving military
members or policies. From the mid-1990’s to the present, both federal
courts and military courts have stumbled in analyzing and applying the
Act, even as the Supreme Court has interpreted it broadly.

1. Early Judicial Consideration of RFRA
The judicial application of RFRA in the military context got off to a
rough start in 1995 in Hartmann v. Stone,238 one of the first cases to
address the Act. There, the Sixth Circuit considered the validity of an
Army regulation that prohibited private, civilian daycare providers on
Army bases from engaging in religious activities while providing family
childcare.239 The court appropriately applied strict scrutiny and struck the
regulation down as invalid, but it did so by deciding the case under the
First Amendment, stumbling badly in its quest not to apply RFRA. The
court started its analysis from a solid premise, finding that the Army’s
policy was not “neutral and generally applicable” – it specifically targeted
religion – and that the regulation would thus receive strict scrutiny even
under the Supreme Court’s free-exercise analysis in Smith.240 Then the
court took a wrong turn. Because it had the ability to apply strict scrutiny
under the First Amendment, the court erroneously believed it must resolve
the case “as we would any other case involving laws or regulations that
are not neutrally and generally applicable, and, as such, we need not
address RFRA.”241
This misguided desire to avoid RFRA turned constitutional analysis
on its head. Under the doctrine of “constitutional avoidance,” courts are
supposed to avoid constitutional decisions if a statutory remedy (such as
RFRA) will suffice.242 As Justice Felix Frankfurter explained over 75
years ago, “[i]f there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in
the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not pass on
questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is
unavoidable.”243 The Supreme Court demonstrated this principle in the
Hobby Lobby case in the context of RFRA, concluding, “[t]he
contraceptive mandate … violates RFRA. Our decision on that statutory
question makes it unnecessary to reach the First Amendment claim raised
238

68 F.3d 973 (6th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 978−79.
240
Id. at 978 (“A rule that uniformly bans all religious practice is not neutral.”)
(citing Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
241
Id.
242
Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944).
243
Id. at 105.
239
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by [the litigants].” 244 The Sixth Circuit’s upside-down analysis in
Hartmann has led at least one other court into error, causing it to
misunderstand the case to stand for the improper proposition that RFRA
“applies only to government actions that are ‘neutral and generally
applicable.’”245 Not so. RFRA’s application does not turn on the religious
neutrality of a government action, but rather on its effect causing a
substantial burden to religious exercise.246
Two years after Hartmann, a United States district court
demonstrated the proper way to apply RFRA in a case involving the
military.247 In Rigdon v. Perry,248 two Air Force chaplains – a Roman
Catholic priest and a Jewish rabbi – sued the DoD after military guidance
prohibited them from encouraging their military chapel congregants from
contacting Congress to support legislation ending the partial-birth abortion
procedure, which was morally abhorrent to the faith of the two
chaplains.249 Applying RFRA, the court held that the restriction placed a
substantial burden on the military chaplains’ free-exercise rights, which
included their right to “‘advance their religious beliefs’” during their
sermons, with the court analogizing that practice to other forms of
religious exercise, such as a church’s program to feed the needy or wearing
a crucifix around one’s neck.250 The court agreed that the DoD had
compelling interests in “a politically-disinterested military, good order and
discipline, and the protection of service members’ rights to participate in
the political process.”251 The court found, however, that the DoD had “not
shown how these interests are in any way furthered by the restriction on
the speech of military chaplains. … It is difficult to understand why the
defendants have singled out for proscription a seemingly innocuous
request to congregants to write to Congress.”252 The court concluded that
the DoD’s compelling interests were “outweighed by the military
chaplains’ right to autonomy in determining the religious content of their
sermons.”253
Other federal courts have since applied RFRA to cases involving
service members, finding potential rights violations when the military
244

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 736 (2014).
Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 346 F. Supp. 2d 122, 137 (D.D.C. 2004) (“In Hartmann
v. Stone, the court held that the RFRA is inapplicable if a regulation is not neutral and
generally applicable.”). On appeal, the D.C. Circuit criticized the judge’s dismissal of
the RFRA claim based on this “questionable theory advocated by neither party.” See
Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 525 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
246
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4
247
See generally Rigdon v. Perry, 962 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1997).
248
Id.
249
See id. at 152.
250
Id. at 161.
251
Id. at 162.
252
Id.
253
Id.
245
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failed to provide requested accommodations, but also recognizing that
RFRA’s reach has its limits. 254 The most notable case in this area was
discussed in the introduction to this Article, when a United States district
court granted Captain Simratpal Singh’s temporary restraining order
against the Army under RFRA, allowing him to maintain his Sikh articles
of faith to wear a beard and turban despite uniform and appearance
regulations.255 In another case, several Sikh soldiers in a similar situation
were denied a preliminary injunction because, during the pendency of the
litigation, the Army already had given them religious accommodations
that essentially provided all of their requested relief.256

2. Judicial Difficulties in Applying RFRA to Military Policies
Military courts rarely have interpreted RFRA in the context of a
criminal court-martial conviction. The Army Court of Criminal Appeals
decided the most significant case in this area, United States v. Webster,257
involving a combat engineer who converted to Islam and refused to deploy
with his unit to Iraq in support of combat operations.258 Webster pleaded
guilty to willfully disobeying an order to prepare for deployment and for
missing his unit’s deployment to Iraq,259 but on appeal he raised RFRA in
an attempt to overturn his pleas, arguing that the “irreconcilable choice
that the Army forced upon [him] constituted the prohibited ‘substantial
burden’ upon his free exercise of religion.”260 The Army countered that it
“did not substantially burden [Webster’s] free exercise of religion because
he ‘could have deployed to Iraq in a non-combatant role, but he [chose]
not to accept this offer’ and ‘any miniscule burden on [his] free exercise
of religion was in the furtherance of . . . a compelling governmental
interest.’”261
254
See, e.g., Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 533 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding that
“the term ‘person’ as used in RFRA should be read consistently with similar language
in constitutional provisions, as interpreted by the Supreme Court at the time Congress
enacted RFRA,” and holding that “four British nationals who brought an action
alleging that they were illegally detained and mistreated at the United States Naval
Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, from 2002 until their release in 2004” could not bring
a claim under RFRA because they are “nonresident aliens”—a class of persons that is
“not among the ‘person[s]’ protected by” RFRA).
255
See Singh v. Carter, 168 F. Supp. 3d 216 (D.D.C. 2016); Singh v. McHugh,
185 F. Supp. 3d 201 (D.D.C. 2016) (granting Sikh’s RFRA claim against the Army);
see also supra notes 9−17 and accompanying text.
256
See Singh v. McConville, 187 F. Supp. 3d 152, 163 (D.D.C. 2016) (denying
injunction).
257
United States v. Webster, 65 M.J. 936 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2008).
258
See id.
259
Id. at 938.
260
Id. at 944, 946.
261
Id. at 946–47.
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Avoiding the substantial burden issue, the Army court assumed
arguendo that a substantial burden had occurred, and it applied RFRA
strict scrutiny to Webster’s claim.262 In doing so, the court cited the
Supreme Court’s decision in Goldman and applied a deferential stance
toward “‘the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the
relative importance of a particular military interest.’”263 The court agreed
that the Army had a “compelling interest in requiring soldiers to deploy
with their units,” and it concluded the Army had used the least restrictive
means to further that interest:
Although the Army required appellant to deploy with his unit, the
Army made numerous allowances for him. The Army afforded him the
opportunity to request relief as a conscientious objector. The Army
gave him the right to request reasonable accommodation of his
religious practices. Finally, although apparently not required to do so
by any regulation, appellant’s commander generously allowed
appellant to deploy with his unit in a non-combatant role.264

The court rejected Webster’s claim, holding that he “had no legal
right or privilege under the First Amendment to refuse obedience to the
order[s]” under the circumstances.265 This case illustrates that applying
RFRA’s strict scrutiny to military decisions can be done without
necessarily “courting anarchy,” as the Supreme Court feared in Smith. 266
Not all courts have fared as well in applying RFRA in the military
context.267 Part of the interpretive problem has been with courts
incorrectly narrowing the definition of “religious exercise” under RFRA
to avoid triggering its protections.268 That was the case in United States v.
Sterling,269 where the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals
reviewed a court-martial conviction for a Marine’s failure to remove a
Bible verse – “No weapon formed against me shall prosper”– from her
shared military workplace desk after receiving an order to do so.270 The
case is clouded by the fact that Sterling “did not inform the person who
ordered her to remove the signs that they had had any religious
significance to [her], the words in context could easily be seen as
combative in tone, and the record reflects that their religious connotation

Id. at 946−48.
Id. at 947 (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986)).
264
Id.
265
Id. at 948.
266
Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888−89 (1990).
267
See United States v. Sterling, 75 M.J. 407 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
268
Id. at 413.
269
United States v. Sterling, 2015 WL 832587, at *1 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Feb.
26, 2015), aff'd on other grounds, 75 M.J. 407 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
270
Id. at *1.
262
263
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was neither revealed nor raised until mid-trial.”271 Notably, that was partly
due to the fact that Sterling represented herself pro se at her courtmartial.272
On Sterling’s first level of appeal, the Navy court wrongly held that
RFRA did not apply to her conduct because the posting of Bible verses on
a workplace computer did not constitute a religious exercise.273 On the
second level of appeal, however, the CAAF found that the Navy court had
“erred in defining ‘religious exercise’ for purposes of RFRA.”274 The
CAAF reasoned that the Navy court’s definition was “too narrow” because
RFRA’s scope includes “‘not only belief and profession but the
performance of (or abstention from) physical acts’ that are ‘engaged in for
religious reasons.’”275
Other courts also have made potential errors in this regard.276 Most
notably, in Wilson v. James,277 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the denial of a servicemember’s RFRA claim.278 The conduct in the case
took place in 2012, after the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy
regarding homosexual conduct had been repealed, but while same-sex
marriage was still unrecognized under federal law.279 Wilson, a Mormon
271

Sterling, 75 M.J. at 410; see also Lisa Mathews, Religious Freedom in the
Military as viewed through the Sterling case, MASON VETERANS & SERVICEMEMBERS
LEGAL CLINIC, (Nov. 22, 2016), https://mvets.law.gmu.edu/2016/11/22/religiousfreedom-in-the-military-as-viewed-through-the-sterling-case
[https://perma.cc/6MNZ-QTFR] (discussing the facts).
272
Sterling, 75 M.J. at 413.
273
Id. at 415.
274
Id. at 410. CAAF affirmed Sterling’s conviction on other grounds because
Sterling had “failed to identify the sincerely held religious belief that made placing
the signs important to her exercise of religion or how the removal of the signs
substantially burdened her exercise of religion in some other way.” Id.
275
Id. at 415 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 710
(2014)). A dissenting judge expressed concern that CAAF’s decision could be read as
requiring religious believers to either ask the government’s permission before
engaging in religious exercise or “to inform the government of the religious nature of
their conduct at the time they engage in it.” Id. at 421–22 (Ohlson, J., dissenting).
276
See, e.g., Heap v. Carter, 112 F. Supp. 3d 402, 422 (E.D. Va. 2015) (denying
the RFRA claim of a Humanist applicant denied entry into the Navy chaplaincy by
making the questionable finding that he had not shown a substantial burden on his
religious exercise because he had “not demonstrated that being a Navy chaplain is part
of the core belief system of Humanism”).
277
Wilson v. James, No. 15-5338, 2016 WL 3043746 (D.C. Cir. May 17, 2016)
(“Appellant has failed to show this letter of reprimand substantially burdened any
religious action or practice so as to violate his rights under the Constitution or
[RFRA].”).
278
See id.
279
Wilson v. James, 139 F. Supp. 3d 410, 418 (D.D.C. 2015), aff'd, No. 15-5338,
2016 WL 3043746 (D.C. Cir. May 17, 2016); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 576. U.S.
644 (2015) (striking down state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage as violative of the
Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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non-commissioned officer in the Utah Air National Guard, “was
reprimanded for sending a personal email to a senior officer outside his
chain of command, using a Utah Air National Guard computer and his
government email account under the Guard's signature block, in violation
of rules and regulations and in disobedience of a prior order.”280
Mistakenly believing that he was emailing a military chaplain at West
Point, Wilson wrote to protest “homosexuality weddings at military
institutions” after reading a report of a same-sex marriage that took place
at a military chapel at West Point.281 His email stated, “Our base chapels
are a place of worship and this [is] a mockery to God and our military core
values. … I hope sir that you will take appropriate action so this does not
happen again.”282 For this he was reprimanded.283
Wilson claimed this reprimand violated RFRA because it
“substantially burdened a religious belief, i.e., that same-sex marriage is a
sin.”284 Remarkably, the court held that “[a] substantial burden on one’s
religious beliefs – as distinct from such a burden on one’s exercise of
religious beliefs – does not violate RFRA.”285 The court stated, “Nothing
prevented [Wilson] from continuing to maintain his beliefs about samesex marriage and homosexuality, just as he had before the [reprimand],
without repercussion.”286 The court admitted that the reprimand “likely
chilled [his] speech regarding his religious beliefs, … [b]ut nowhere does
[he] assert that [his religious] doctrine requires him to publicly voice his
dissent about homosexuality or same-sex marriage.”287 The court further
stated, “[E]ven if [his] speech about same-sex marriage could be
considered a religious exercise under RFRA, … a neutral regulation that
places a limit on where someone may engage in religiously motivated
expression does not … constitute a ‘substantial burden’ on religious
exercise.”288
In light of the neutral regulations governing the use of government
computers and email systems, it may be true that Wilson did not plead
sufficient facts to establish the substantial burden required under RFRA.
Still, it is impossible to square the court’s statement that burdening
religious belief is insufficient to trigger a RFRA claim, especially

280

Wilson, 2016 WL 304746 at *1.
Wilson, 139 F. Supp. 3d at 418.
282
Id.
283
Id. at 420.
284
Id. at 424.
285
Id. (citing Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(stating that “[r]eligious exercise necessarily involves an action or practice” and the
government’s collection and storage of the plaintiff’s DNA did not “pressure [him] to
modify his own behavior in any way that would violate his beliefs”)).
286
Id. at 425.
287
Id.
288
Id. (citing Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
281
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considering the Supreme Court’s statement in Hobby Lobby (echoed by
CAAF in Sterling) that “the ‘exercise of religion’ involves ‘not only belief
and profession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts’
that are ‘engaged in for religious reasons.’”289 Nor would the court’s
statement comport with current guidance within DoD Instruction 1300.17,
which recognizes as part of “religious practice” actions that constitute
“individual expressions of religious beliefs, whether or not compelled by,
or central to, the religion concerned.”290 Wilson’s email to a chaplain’s
office expressing his religious beliefs about morality, motivated by his
faith, would surely fit this definition.291

VI. LOSING MY RELIGION: WILL THE MILITARY BACKSLIDE ON ITS
RFRA CONVERSION?
After nearly 30 years under RFRA, the DoD’s regulations have
finally embraced the principles enshrined in the Act’s words.292 Yet new
challenges presented by seismic shifts in cultural practices and by novel
issues arising during the Covid-19 pandemic have already challenged
whether the military is serious about applying RFRA’s rigors. Part VI will
first provide some comments on how the military should analyze a RFRA
claim in light of the precedent and regulations discussed earlier. It will
then examine a series of real-world hypotheticals and suggest how a
faithful application of RFRA might unfold today.

A. Analyzing a RFRA Military Claim Today
The most recent version of DoDI 1300.17 sets out detailed guidance
and a coherent process for requesting religious accommodations in the
military, along with strict time guidelines for acting on those requests.293
That guidance mostly seems to comport with the spirit of RFRA,
considering the unique nature of military service.294 Notably, “the burden

289

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 710 (2014).
DOD INSTRUCTION 1300.17, Religious Liberty in the Military Services, para.
G.2 (Sept. 1, 2020).
291
Wilson, 139 F. Supp. 3d at 418.
292
DOD INSTRUCTION 1300.17, Religious Liberty in the Military Services, para.
G.2 (Sept. 1, 2020).
293
See generally id.; see also supra notes 222–237 and accompanying text
(discussing the DoD guidance).
294
See DOD INSTRUCTION 1300.17, Religious Liberty in the Military Services,
para. 1.2(e) (Sept. 1, 2020) (stating that, if a “military policy, practice or duty
substantially burdens a Service member’s exercise of religion, accommodation can
only be denied if: (1) [t]he military policy, practice, or duty is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest[; and] (2) [i]t is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest”). The religious practice can be “[a]n
290
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of proof is placed upon the DoD Component, not the individual requesting
the exemption.”295 In addition, the CAAF has set out a succinct statement
of the law explaining the burdens in a RFRA case in the trial setting:
[The servicemember] must show by a preponderance of the evidence
that the government action (1) substantially burdens (2) a religious
belief (3) that the [member] sincerely holds.296 If a claimant establishes
a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the government to show that its
actions were “the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling
governmental interest.”297

In light of this guidance, it should be clear that an older military case
may present outdated, bad law that military leaders cannot rely upon.298
For instance, contrary to Bitterman v. Secretary of Defense, RFRA does
not require that a claimed religious practice be a religious “requirement,”
rather than a mere “preference.”299 Not only do RFRA and military
regulations establish that religious exercise is protected by the Act
“whether or not compelled by, or central to, the religion concerned,”300 but
also it would be inappropriate for courts to wade into ecclesiastical matters
involving internal religious doctrines and practices to determine what is
“central” or “required” or “preferred” in one’s faith.301 Further, recent
DoD guidance defining whether a religious practice is “substantially
burdened” provides a helpful test that can clarify what has often been a
difficult inquiry in the past.302 It should not be forgotten, however, that a
substantial burden may occur even where the government prevents

action, behavior, or course of conduct constituting individual expressions of religious
beliefs….” Id. at para. G.2.
295
Id. at para. 1.2(e).
296
United States v. Sterling, 75 M.J. 407, 415−16 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (citing Holt
v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015)); United States v. Zimmerman, 514 F.3d 851, 853 (9th
Cir. 2007); Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 960 (10th Cir. 2001)).
297
Sterling, 75 M.J. at 416 (citing United States v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717,
719–20 (10th Cir. 2010)).
298
See Bitterman v. Secretary of Defense, 553 F. Supp. 719, 726 (D.D.C. 1982).
299
Id.
300
DOD INSTRUCTION 1300.17, Religious Liberty in the Military Services, para.
G.2 (Sept. 1, 2020).
301
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (“It is well established
. . . that courts should refrain from trolling through a person’s or institution’s religious
beliefs.”).
302
See DOD INSTRUCTION 1300.17, Religious Liberty in the Military Services,
para. G.2 (Sept. 1, 2020) (defining a “substantial burden” is an act by the government
that “[r]equires participation in an activity prohibited by a sincerely held religious
belief; [p]revents participation in conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious
belief; or [p]laces substantial pressure on a Service member to engage in conduct
contrary to a sincerely held religious belief”) (adopting the Tenth Circuit’s test in
Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 55 (10th Cir. 2014)).
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“conduct” as simple as an “individual expression[] of religious beliefs.”303
And once it is established that the government has placed a substantial
burden on a sincerely held religious belief or practice by a servicemember,
the exacting demands of strict scrutiny come into play.304
First and foremost, the military interest underlying the government
action must be compelling – not only to the military’s “broadly formulated
interests” in uniformity and efficiency, but also at a granular level: the
military’s interest must be so compelling that an exemption cannot be
granted to the “particular religious claimants” making the request.305
While it is appropriate to consider the factors set out in DoDI 1300.17 in
this regard,306 military leaders must apply those factors through a
particularized analysis of the interest “‘to the person.’”307 In other words,
the military cannot satisfy the compelling interest test merely by asserting
a need for good order and discipline, or relying on abstract, generalized
interests.308 This is well-illustrated in O Centro Espírita, where the
government’s grant of exceptions to the use of a Schedule I drug by Native
Americans demonstrated that the allegedly compelling interest in
uniformly enforcing Schedule I drug laws was not so compelling that an
exception could not be made for the particular claimants in the case309 – a
concept that will recur in military situations when analyzing prior
exceptions granted to various rules, regulations, or policies.
When considering the military’s asserted compelling interest in a
RFRA case, courts should consider the unique nature of military life,
which traditionally demands some restriction of individual liberty and
autonomy.310 In the context of RFRA, however, Congress has already
considered the important interests in unique institutions such as prisons

303

Id. at para. 1.2.
See id. at G2.
305
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 710 (2014) (quoting
Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431
(2006)).
306
DOD INSTRUCTION 1300.17, Religious Liberty in the Military Services, para.
3.2(d), 3.3(d) (Sept. 1, 2020) (outlining factors for consideration).
307
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
430–31 (2006).
308
See id. at 419.
309
Id. at 433.
310
See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 507 (1986) (“[T]o accomplish its
mission the military must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit
de corps. The essence of military service is the subordination of the desires and
interests of the individual to the needs of the service.”); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 758
(1974) (“The fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for
imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would
be constitutionally impermissible outside it.”); United States v. Priest, 45 C.M.R. 338,
344 (C.M.A. 1972) (“In the armed forces some restrictions exist for reasons that have
no counterpart in the civilian community.”).
304
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and the military, and it has “placed a thumb on the scale in favor of
protecting religious exercise” despite those special situations.311 Further,
as the Supreme Court has explained, “Congress enacted RFRA in order to
provide greater protection for religious exercise than is available under the
First Amendment.”312 This fact lessens the weight of some of the preRFRA Supreme Court cases discussing traditional military deference. For
good or ill, the days of an unyielding military uniformity that breaks down
individuality and replaces it with unit cohesion are over. The unique
religious practices of service members can now make them stand out –
many have and continue to stand out as performers – as individuals within
their units.
Even if an asserted military interest is compelling enough to enforce
against the particular claimants making a RFRA accommodation request,
the second prong of strict scrutiny must also be satisfied.313 In the words
of DoDI 1300.17, there must be no “[a]lternate means available to address
the requested accommodation,” and “[t]he means that is least restrictive to
the requestor’s religious practice and that does not impede a compelling
governmental interest will be determinative.”314 Although satisfying the
least-restrictive-means standard is “exceptionally demanding,” it is not
impossible to meet.315
With the above analysis in mind, it is now possible to examine several
real-world scenarios that will put the DoD’s newfound embrace of RFRA
to the test.

B. Applying RFRA to Real-World Military Scenarios
The final section of this Article suggests hypotheticals in four areas
that the military services have been struggling to address or might expect
to address in the foreseeable future. While each scenario cannot be
definitively resolved due to the individualized nature of each RFRA case,
this section will provide some comments and discussion on areas of legal
analysis for each scenario.

311

Singh v. McHugh, 185 F. Supp. 3d 201, 222 (D.D.C. 2016) (discussing why
traditional deference to the military is not as great in RFRA cases as under the First
Amendment).
312
Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 357 (2015) (setting aside prison appearance
requirement for beard).
313
See id. at 353.
314
DOD INSTRUCTION 1300.17, Religious Liberty in the Military Services, para.
3.2(d) (Sept. 1, 2020).
315
See, e.g., Sherwood v. Brown, 619 F.2d 47, 47−48 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding
that a Navy uniform regulation was the least restrictive means of furthering the
military interest in preventing wear of a turban because the evidence presented showed
that Sikhs could not wear helmets and that the “[a]bsence of a helmet poses serious
safety problems for both the unprotected sailor and for the crew that depends on him”).
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1. Uniform and Appearance Regulations
Throughout this Article, several examples have illustrated the
military’s longstanding unwillingness to accommodate the religious
practices of minority religions with regard to dress and appearance while
on duty.316 But in the past decade, it seems that the uniform-andappearance-accommodation wars within the military have been fully
waged and won by the individual religious members seeking those
accommodations.317 While this high-profile issue was boiling over as
recently as five years ago, a series of embarrassing judicial setbacks in
RFRA cases brought by Sikhs has led to new policies that have blown the
accommodation door wide open.318
Under revised uniform and
appearance policies, beards, turbans, dreadlocks, and hijabs are now
accommodated regularly, with some commanders even granting
accommodations to wear beards for Norse Heathen and Pagan members.319
With the opening of this door, it is hard to envision sincere religious
uniform-and-appearance requests that could be denied by military leaders
in the future. Perhaps the rigors of actual combat or the need to wear
specialized equipment (e.g., hazardous materials suits, flight helmets, or
underwater breathing apparatuses) might justify some denials under
limited conditions. With the recent dramatic changes to appearance and
grooming standards, however, the military would have difficulty claiming
that prior rationales supporting uniform regulations – uniformity,
discipline, esprit de corps, and efficiency – still constitute a compelling
interest.320 If a Sikh can wear a turban instead of a helmet, and a Muslim
can cover her hair with a hijab while in uniform, and a Norse Heathen can
wear a beard instead of shaving, then under what rationale would a
commander legitimately deny similar requests from other religious
members?
Envision the following situation.
A female Muslim Army
servicemember requests an accommodation to wear a more intensive
316

See discussion supra Sections I, III.B.
See supra Part VI.A.
318
See, e.g., Singh v. Carter, 168 F. Supp. 3d 216, 218 (D.D.C. 2016); Singh v.
McHugh, 185 F. Supp. 3d 201, 204 (D.D.C. 2016); Singh v. McConville, 187 F. Supp.
3d 152, 163 (D.D.C. 2016).
319
See Stephen Losey, Air Force officially OKs beards, turbans, hijabs for
religious
reasons,
AIR
FORCE
TIMES
(Feb.
11,
2020),
https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2020/02/11/air-force-officiallyoks-beards-turbans-hijabs-for-religious-reasons/
[https://perma.cc/47Y6-R9Y7]
(“[T]wo airmen who follow the Norse Heathen, or pagan, faiths have been granted
permission to wear a beard.”); see also Dickstein, supra note 17.
320
See generally Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal,
546 U.S. 418 (2006) (explaining that the exemption of peyote for Native Americans
undermined any compelling interest to uniformly enforce the Controlled Substances
Act).
317
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body-covering over her uniform, such as a one-piece veil that covers her
entire face and body (i.e., a “burqa”) or a veil that covers her face but
leaves the area around her eyes open (a “niqab”). Does RFRA require the
Army to grant either of these accommodations? Both requests could easily
be established as sincerely held religious beliefs, since they are common
religious garb throughout Islam. Nor would it be difficult for the
servicemember to establish that rules preventing the wear of such garb
would “substantially burden” her religious practice, thus triggering strict
scrutiny.
If the Army were to resist such an intense change to its uniform-andappearance rules, it might be able to muster stronger compelling interests
to prohibit a burqa than it was able to conjure with regard to turbans or
hijabs, perhaps based on safety concerns (e.g., danger of a loose-fitting
veil near machinery) or movement concerns (e.g., unable to perform
physical-fitness requirements). But would the Army be willing to assert
the same dubious interests that some European nations have used to
entirely ban burqas in public, such as worries about security and personal
identification, or perhaps to avoid “gender oppression?” In S.A.S. v.
France,321 the European Court of Human Rights rejected some of those
asserted interests as invalid, but the court did uphold France’s ban of the
burqa based on its asserted interests in furthering “social communication,”
a “principle of interaction between individuals” that was “essential for”
pluralism.322
Still, even if some of those asserted interests could be considered
“compelling” (when tailored to the particular claimant), the leastrestrictive-means analysis would pose further challenges to the Army’s
outright denial of an accommodation request. Depending on the asserted
compelling interests, there would likely be occasions when those interests
would not be furthered by prohibiting the wear of a burqa, leaving open
the possibility of a limited accommodation that would be less restrictive
than a full ban. For instance, many positions in the military are performed
in work environments without hazardous conditions (e.g., personnel,
headquarters positions, the JAG Corps). And even though military
members must deploy and engage in physical-fitness events, that does not
justify a complete ban on the requested body-covering. A one-size-fits-all
approach is not the least restrictive way to accommodate such a request.
In short, if the Army is serious about respecting RFRA, it will need to
accept the possibility that a limited accommodation might be warranted in
some circumstances.
As an aside, if accommodating the burqa is too “extreme” for the
Army, surely the wearing of a niqab would now be accommodated, due to
321
43835/11
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
(2014),
available
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145466 [https://perma.cc/7ZMG-93A3].
322
Id. at para. 153.
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the Army’s current acceptance of hijabs combined with the long-term
mask requirements being mandated against military members during the
Covid-19 pandemic.323 If the face can be partly covered for medical
reasons for the entire Army, then what possible interest could justify
preventing a single claimant from covering her face for religious reasons?
After Covid-19, it will be substantially more difficult for the military to
assert a plausible compelling interest against a particular servicemember
wearing a niqab, which covers a woman’s face to a similar degree as the
Covid masks already integrated into everyday military life.

2. Religious Expression in the Military Workplace
Although the Establishment Clause prevents the government from
turning the military workplace into a religious environment, RFRA
prevents the military from excluding individual religious expression from
that same workplace.324 This has been another longstanding issue because
well-meaning supervisors, wishing to avoid any appearance of established
religion, are sometimes overzealous in their crusade to expel religion from
the workplace.325 They are especially sensitive when a military member
speaks about religion on a military installation, especially if the speech is
considered a form of “proselytizing.”326
For instance, in 2016, an Air Force commander wrongly directed his
subordinates to physically remove a retired, 33-year senior enlisted
member who was giving a speech as an invited guest at a private flagfolding ceremony that was to be performed at another member’s
retirement ceremony from the military.327 The commander believed that
the speech would violate Air Force policy because it referenced “God”
several times.328 Only after a lawsuit was brought did the Air Force
modify its policy, making it clear that such future speeches would be
323

Josie Fischels, The Pentagon Will Require Masks To Be Worn Indoors Even
By Those Who Are Vaccinated, NPR (July 28, 2021, 6:01 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2021/07/28/1021925844/thepentagon-masks-indoors-even-vaccinated-cdc-covid [https://perma.cc/E85W-TGZ5].
324
See, e.g., United States v. Sterling, 75 M.J. 407, 417 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
325
See Lisa Mathews, Religious Freedom in the Military as viewed through the
Sterling
case,
M-VETS
(Nov.
22,
2016),
https://mvets.law.gmu.edu/2016/11/22/religious-freedom-in-the-military-as-viewedthrough-the-sterling-case/#_ednref25 [https://perma.cc/5C8D-FWZG].
326
See Bob Smietana, Troops inclined to proselytize may face court martial,
USA
TODAY
(May
2,
2013,
12:30
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/05/02/military-banproselytizing/2129189/ [https://perma.cc/AP3B-6FYK].
327
See
Oscar
Rodriguez,
Jr.
Case,
FIRST
LIBERTY,
https://firstliberty.org/cases/oscar-rodriguez/ [https://perma.cc/LPE2-2MK5] (last
visited Feb. 4, 2022).
328
Id.
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permissible.329 Surprisingly, some commanders have even targeted the
religious speech of chaplains performing spiritual counseling of
servicemembers behind closed doors.330 As one example, in 2014, the
Navy threatened (but later relented) to take a potentially career-ending
action against one of its highly decorated, 19-year Christian chaplains who
“took a strong stance in counseling sessions on subjects like sex outside
marriage and homosexuality.”331
For years, military legal advisors have recognized the problem with
singling out religious speech for exclusion in the workplace. As one Air
Force scholar noted:
If some personal conversations are permitted in the workplace during
duty hours (e.g., pertaining to sports or social events), leaders cannot
place religion off-limits. The same is true regarding religious displays
in the barracks: if personal nonreligious items are permitted to be
displayed in rooms, religious items must be permitted to the same
extent. Otherwise, the discrimination against religious speech would
be content-based and would almost certainly not survive scrutiny by
the courts or by military investigators looking into a complaint.332

This is good advice only made stronger by the DoD’s recent embrace
of RFRA.
These religious-expression issues also touch upon the right to free
speech, even though courts generally afford less protection to the speech
of service members, and some speech is unprotected by the First
Amendment, such as “fighting words,” “obscenity,” and “dangerous
speech.”333 For military members, there may be additional restrictions on
speech that is contemptuous, prejudicial to good order and discipline, or

See Rodriguez v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 387 F. Supp. 3d 130, 132–33
(D.D.C. 2019), appeal dismissed, No. 19-5216, 2021 WL 1045489 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18,
2021) (dismissing a RFRA claim for lack of personal jurisdiction, but noting that the
Air Force had already changed its policy to allow private speeches that referenced
religion at future flag-folding ceremonies).
330
See,
e.g.,
Chaplain
Modder
Case,
FIRST
LIBERTY,
https://firstliberty.org/cases/chaplainmodder/ [https://perma.cc/VCK6-TC2F] (last
visited Feb. 4, 2022).
331
Paul Strand, Military Chaplains Orders: Follow Policy, Not Scripture, CBN
(June 10, 2015), https://www1.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2015/June/War-on-ChaplainsDemise-of-the-US-Military [https://perma.cc/W2UM-FFBW]; see also Chaplain
Modder Case, supra note 330.
332
David E. Fitzkee, Religious Speech in the Military: Freedoms and
Limitations, 41 US ARMY WAR COLL. Q.: PARAMETERS 59, 60 (2011).
333
United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 446–48 (C.A.A.F. 2008)
(“[S]ervicemembers enjoy some measure of the right to free speech granted by the
First Amendment.”).
329
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of a nature to discredit the armed services. 334 But otherwise-protected
military speech may only be prohibited when the government makes a
“direct and palpable connection between the speech and the military
mission or military environment.”335
Envision the following situation. An Air Force servicemember is
also a devout member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints,
often referred to as “LDS” or “Mormon.” As a member of an Air Force
Security Forces unit, he and his fellow airmen perform their duties
safeguarding a building that contains high-value space-launch assets.
During the course of a typical shift, they have the chance to speak together
in the guard shack as they keep an eye on an entrance gate, in between
perimeter sweeps. Often, the members discuss the latest sports events,
news around local community, movies, musical groups, and ambitions for
school. In accordance with his religion, the member believes it is his
religious obligation to spread his faith to others. On several occasions, he
shares his LDS faith with fellow unit members during their shifts. One of
the other guards complains to their commander that this amounts to
“proselytizing on duty,” and the member’s supervisor directs him to stop
making his fellow members feel “uncomfortable” at work by talking about
religion. Does RFRA require the Air Force to allow this member to
continue speaking about his faith on duty?
To begin, the military might make the dubious argument from the
Wilson case, referenced earlier, that RFRA does not apply to this situation
because expressing one’s religious beliefs is not a form of religious
exercise (plus, RFRA allows burdens on belief but not practice).336 While
that argument should never have been accepted by the district court in
Wilson, after the newest revision of DoDI 1300.17, the claim is untenable
because the regulation itself admits that “religious practice” includes acts
that constitute “individual expressions of religious beliefs, whether or not
compelled by, or central to, the religion concerned.”337 Here, the member
will be able to establish that preaching his faith is part of his religious
practice as an LDS member, and that preventing him from doing so
impacts his religious exercise.
The Air Force might argue next that preventing a member from
speaking about his faith at work is not a “substantial burden” because it is
334
10 U.S.C. § 934. Importantly, courts “must be sensitive to protection from
‘the principle of free thought—not free thought for those who agree with us but
freedom for the thought we hate.’” United States v. Priest, 21 C.M.A. 564, 570
(C.M.A. 1972) (citing United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654−55 (1929)).
335
Wilcox, 66 M.J. at 448.
336
See Wilson v. James, No. 15-5338, 2016 WL 3043746 at *1 (D.C. Cir. May
17, 2016) (upholding the district court’s questionable dismissal of a RFRA claim for
lack of demonstrating a substantial burden).
337
DOD INSTRUCTION 1300.17, Religious Liberty in the Military Services, para.
G.2 (Sept. 1, 2020).
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a de minimis interference with that exercise (i.e., there are other times the
member can talk about religion “off-duty”). Applying the broad definition
of a “substantial burden” adopted by the DoD in its regulations, the
member might prevail against this line of attack by showing that a
prohibition on his religious speech at work “[p]revents [his] participation
in conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief.” 338 Again, the
Air Force might counter that he can participate off-duty, and thus this is
still a de minimis burden; however, that argument is unlikely to prevail.
When the Air Force accepts workplace speech about sports and music and
school, it is opening up the workplace to discussion about life in general.
To tell a person whose faith encourages them to share their beliefs in
everyday life situations that they may not do so, even though everyone
around them is discussing such matters, is more than a de minimis burden
because it forces the member to divorce his faith from his everyday life in
a way that is untrue to his religious identity. Not only that, under the freespeech line of First Amendment cases, such a content-based exclusion of
religious speech in the workplace would trigger strict scrutiny for other
reasons.339
Faced with overcoming strict scrutiny, the Air Force would no doubt
assert that it had a compelling interest in preventing members from
“proselytizing” in the workplace because “proselytizing can affect the
listener’s morale and ability to do his job and thus interfere with mission
accomplishment and unit effectiveness.”340 For the Air Force to prevail
using this interest, it must show more than generalities and platitudes,
because RFRA requires that the compelling interest be demonstrated with
this particular religious claimant’s conduct. That a military commander
subjectively believes or deems religious speech to be contrary to mission
accomplishment is insufficient. If the speech is to be prohibited, there
must be a “direct and palpable” connection to the claimant’s speech.341
Further, in the parlance of free-speech cases, “the Free Speech Clause
does not require a speaker to cease speaking a message just because others
do not like hearing it.”342 For instance, conversations about sports teams
or happenings in the community often lead to animated conversations
between individuals, perhaps even conflict as one person boasts about his
favorite team. Why would it be permissible to have that kind of discomfort
in the workplace, but not the kind that stems from a religious conversation?
Here, the compelling-interest inquiry will be fact-intensive. Depending
338

Id.
See Fitzkee, supra note 332, at 60 (discussing First Amendment rules for
content-based restrictions).
340
Major (ret.) David E. Fitzkee & Captain Linell A. Letendre, Religion in the
Military: Navigating the Channel Between the Religion Clauses, 59 A.F. L. REV. 1,
35−36 (2007).
341
United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 449 (C.A.A.F. 2008).
342
Fitzkee and Letendre, supra note 340, at 35.
339
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on how the member has shared his faith, there might be an argument to
support this interest. Is the member abusive towards others when sharing
his faith? Does he disparage others’ faiths, especially using offensive or
vulgar terms? Does he follow others around, despite being told to leave
them alone, and yell at them about their sinful lives while they attempt to
conduct their official duties? Or is the member simply sharing his personal
beliefs during appropriate conversations about life? The devil is in the
details.
Even if it could be established, as related to this particular claimant,
that there is a compelling interest in preventing his religious speech in the
workplace, the Air Force still must overcome the least-restrictive-means
test.343 Perhaps the compelling interest can be met simply by ordering the
member to “tone down” his aggressiveness when discussing religion, if he
is the abusive type. Or perhaps the real problem is that the Air Force
allows its members to discuss their personal lives at work. It might be less
restrictive to simply require all conversations in the workplace to be
directly work-related (But who would want to live in such an
environment?). At what cost would the Air Force be willing to go to
exclude religious speech from the workplace?
Absent extreme misbehavior by this LDS member, it is likely that the
Air Force will need to accommodate his religious practice of discussing
his faith during everyday life conversations. The hypothetical might work
itself out differently, however, if other coercive elements were present.
For instance, if the religious member were a supervisor and his listeners
were a captive audience, the coercive element would add extra weight to
the Air Force interest involved, and might warrant a more restrictive
means of addressing it.344 If the member used threats of violence to
proselytize, a different result would also be warranted, no doubt. For the
everyday conversations described in this scenario, however, if the Air
Force is serious about respecting RFRA, it will need to accept that
religious speech in the workplace is simply part of life.

3. Religious Issues Related to LGBTQ+ Rights
Perhaps the most difficult and sensitive civil-rights issue of recent
years has been balancing the now-recognized intimate, constitutional
rights of lesbian, gay, bi-sexual, transgender, queer, and other individuals
(“LGBTQ+”) with venerable First Amendment (and RFRA-based)
conscience rights of certain religious individuals. Some religious faiths
343

Id. at 23.
See, e.g., Fitzkee, supra note 332, at 66−67 (“Proselytizing violates the
Establishment Clause if military members are misusing their official position to
advance, favor, endorse, or coerce religion. This might apply to members of the chain
of command proselytizing subordinates on duty or to service providers proselytizing
customers while providing a service.”).
344

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol87/iss2/6

50

Berry and Kolenc: Born-Again RFRA: Will the Military Backslide on its Religious Con

2022]

THE RFRA AND THE MILITARY

485

hold sincere beliefs that same-sex sexual conduct is immoral, that samesex marriage denigrates the holiness of marriage itself, and that one’s Godgiven biological sex cannot be morally changed.345 The Supreme Court
referenced this clash of rights in its landmark decision legalizing same-sex
marriage on constitutional grounds:
Many who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion
based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises,
and neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here. … [T]hose who
adhere to religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost,
sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should
not be condoned. The First Amendment ensures that religious
organizations and persons are given proper protection as they seek to
teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives
and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations to continue the family
structure they have long revered.346

The Court’s description of those holding these religious positions is
respectful and compassionate, similar to the Court’s recognition that
“same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as oppositesex couples, and it would disparage their choices and diminish their
personhood to deny them this right.”347
A crucial legal challenge going forward in society will be to find a
way to affirm the rights of those “decent and honorable” religious persons
who wish to abstain from approval of, or involvement with, what they
believe to be morally objectionable conduct, while at the same time not
“diminish[ing] the[] personhood” of those in the LGBTQ+ community
who merely seek to exercise their constitutionally protected rights and
freedoms.348 This is no small task, and it is made more complex when it
is imported into the military environment, where unit cohesion is essential
and individual rights must sometimes give way.
This is a fairly recent problem in the U.S. Armed Forces, however,
because for most of the nation’s history, the concept of LGBTQ+ rights
was entirely foreign in the military – in fact, the conduct that is today
constitutionally protected was criminalized or prohibited as recently as
2011, until the repeal of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy.349 With full
acceptance of LGBTQ+ members into the military over the past decade –
most recently in January 2021, with President Joe Biden’s executive order
permitting transgender servicemembers350 – the pendulum has now swung
345

See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 672, 671–72 (2015).
Id. at 679–80.
347
Id. at 672.
348
Id.
349
See Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–321.
350
President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Executive Order on Enabling All Qualified
Americans to Serve Their Country in Uniform, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 25, 2021),
346
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in the other direction, with those who have moral opposition to such
conduct being censored or reprimanded for expressing their religious
beliefs or refusing to participate in certain actions that violate their
consciences.351
For instance, in 2017, an Air Force colonel was found to have
violated equal employment opportunity (“EEO”) regulations when his
Christian beliefs about marriage would not permit him in good conscience
to sign an honorary “certificate of spouse appreciation” for the same-sex
spouse of one of his retiring military members.352 As an informal
accommodation, a higher-ranking officer signed the certificate instead;
however, when the enlisted member filed an EEO complaint, the Air Force
initially substantiated it as unlawful discrimination.353 Later, the Secretary
of the Air Force reversed, concluding that the colonel “had the right to
exercise his sincerely held religious beliefs and did not unlawfully
discriminate when he declined to sign the certificate of appreciation.”354
At least one scholar has argued the Air Force had not “substantially
burdened” the colonel’s religious exercise, but had only offended his
“religious sensibilities” because his “signature on a certificate of
appreciation for his Airman’s spouse no more ‘enabled’ or ‘facilitated’
that marriage than would the act of eating a handful of mints left over from
the wedding reception.”355 But the heart of that scholar’s argument – that
the colonel’s belief was unreasonable because its link to same-sex
marriage was attenuated – was rejected by the Supreme Court in Hobby
Lobby.356
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidentialactions/2021/01/25/executive-order-on-enabling-all-qualified-americans-to-servetheir-country-in-uniform/ [https://perma.cc/BG9G-6Z2C].
351
See Peter Reid, Air Force grants appeal to Colonel who was suspended for
gay
marriage
views,
AM.
MIL.
NEWS,
(Apr.
4,
2018),
https://americanmilitarynews.com/2018/04/air-force-grants-appeal-to-colonel-whowas-suspended-for-gay-marriage-views/ [https://perma.cc/44FN-LR6T].
352
Id.;
see
also
Col.
Bohannon
Case,
FIRST LIBERTY,
https://firstliberty.org/cases/bohannon/ [https://perma.cc/J6KF-2QW7] (last visited
Feb. 4, 2022).
353
Col. Bohannon Case, supra note 352.
354
See Letter from Heather Wilson, Sec’y A.F., to Rep. Doug Lamborn (Apr. 2,
2018)
(available
at
https://lamborn.house.gov/sites/lamborn.house.gov/files/migrated/UploadedFiles/Co
l._Bohannon_Response_Letter_from_Air_Force_April_2_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9HJL-2AZ3]).
355
Thomas G. Becker, Culture Wars: The Clash Between Religion and the
Rights of Same-Sex Members in the United States Air Force, THE REPORTER 1, 4–5
(June 2019).
356
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 723–24 (2014)
(considering the dissent’s argument that “the connection between what the objecting
parties must do (provide health-insurance coverage for four methods of contraception
that may operate after the fertilization of an egg) and the end that they find to be
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Envision the following situation. A female Navy officer who is also
a surgeon is a devout Orthodox Jew who believes that a person’s biological
sex is a gift from God that cannot be changed because God made persons
as “male” and “female.” The officer is assigned to a Navy hospital that
performs gender-transition surgeries for servicemembers who identify as
a different gender then that of their biological sex. The officer requests a
religious accommodation that would free her from any requirement to
perform gender-transition surgeries on servicemembers. Does RFRA
require the Navy to grant an exemption? This is not a far-fetched scenario.
Though it has not yet been litigated in the military context, gender-identity
RFRA cases have already arisen due to threatened penalties from the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services under the Affordable Care
Act.357
Assuming this Navy officer is expressing a sincere religious belief, it
seems clear that forcing her to perform gender-transition surgeries in
opposition to her conscience and morals would be a “substantial burden”
because it would “[r]equire [ her] participation in an activity prohibited by
a sincerely held religious belief” (i.e., surgically creating bodily changes
in contradiction to a person’s biological sex).358 Failure to perform those
duties could lead to criminal or administrative penalties, such as a courtmartial for failing to obey a lawful order.359 This would present a similar
situation to the Affordable Care Act gender case, where the court found
the burden to be “placing substantial pressure on Christian Plaintiffs, in
the form of fines and civil liability, to perform and provide insurance
coverage for gender-transition procedures.”360 The imposition of this
burden would trigger RFRA’s strict scrutiny.361
Under strict scrutiny, the Navy would likely assert a compelling
interest in having military doctors perform their required duties to
complete medically indicated procedures in accordance with the law and
morally wrong (destruction of an embryo) is simply too attenuated,” and rejecting that
argument because it “dodges the question that RFRA presents (whether the HHS
mandate imposes a substantial burden on the ability of the objecting parties to conduct
business in accordance with their religious beliefs) and instead addresses a very
different question that the federal courts have no business addressing (whether the
religious belief asserted in a RFRA case is reasonable)).
357
See Franciscan All., Inc. v. Becerra, No. 7:16-CV-00108-O, 2021 WL
3492338, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2021) (granting a permanent injunction in favor of
Christian medical associations required “to perform and insure abortions and gendertransition procedures or face penalties for unlawful discrimination”).
358
See DOD INSTRUCTION 1300.17, Religious Liberty in the Military Services,
para. G.2 (Sept. 1, 2020) (defining a “substantial burden”).
359
See 10 U.S.C. 890, Art. 90.
360
Becerra, 2021 WL 3492338, at *10.
361
See Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4) invalidated by City
of Borne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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the individual needs of transgendered patients. But RFRA’s compellinginterest standard would require the Navy to show more than a generic
desire to have military doctors perform their duties. It would need to tailor
the compelling interest to this particular religious claimant and establish
that granting her an exemption would result in the inability of the Navy to
complete medically indicated gender-transition procedures. In other
words, if other doctors at the Navy hospital could perform the surgery
instead of the claimant, the Navy would be unable to establish a
sufficiently compelling individualized government interest. Notably, in
the Affordable Care Act gender case, the government was unable to state
a compelling interest, instead “assert[ing] no ‘harm [in] granting specific
exemptions’ to Christian Plaintiffs [from performing gender-identity
surgeries].”362
Even if it could state a compelling interest, however, the Navy would
likely lose the case under the least-restrictive-means analysis. For
instance, would not a less restrictive means of handling the situation be to
assign doctors without moral objections to that facility, or perhaps to have
the surgery done at another hospital where doctors were available, or even
at a local civilian hospital in accordance with medical agreements between
the base and civilian community? It is highly unlikely that the only
practicable way for the Navy to perform these surgeries would be to force
this particular claimant to violate her religious beliefs upon pains of
disobeying an order and facing criminal or administrative punishment.
In short, if the Navy is serious about respecting RFRA, it will need
to accept that some of its religious members will not be available to
complete gender-transition surgeries and other LGBTQ+-related acts that
would violate their religious beliefs.

4. Religious Issues Related to Health and Medicine
Perhaps the single biggest issue since March 2020 has been the global
Covid-19 pandemic and the response of governments to the situation,
including mask-mandates, vaccine-mandates, and the closing down of
churches to minimize transmission of the virus. 363 The Supreme Court has
weighed in on several cases, indicating that some governments have
targeted religion in their responses to the pandemic.364 In 2021, the Biden
Administration implemented stronger measures to require that the Covid-

362

Id.
See, e.g., Antony Barone Kolenc, Religious Liberty in the Age of COVID,
UNT DALLAS COLL. OF L., ACCESSIBLE L., Spring 2021, at 2 (discussing Covid-19
issues and freedom of religion).
364
Id.
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19 vaccine be taken by as many individuals as possible, including military
members, federal employees, and federal contractors.365
Envision the following situation. In 2022, a new global pandemic
strikes: Covid-22. To fight the pandemic, leaders in the Marine Corps
require all Marines to be vaccinated. Due to problems with managing
religious exemptions during the Covid-19 vaccination debacle, the Marine
Corps issues a policy that provides for no religious exemptions. A Marine
enlisted member, who is a devoted Roman Catholic with a strong objection
to abortion or the use of aborted fetuses for medical research, learns that
none of the available vaccines for Covid-22 were tested, developed, or
produced without some connection to abortion. Although the Marine
Corps has said it will not provide any religious exemptions this time
around, the Marine requests one anyway, citing RFRA as the basis for the
request. Does RFRA require the Marine Corps to grant the vaccine
exemption to this member? This scenario is not far removed from the
Covid-19 situation, in light of the Biden Administration’s policy to
minimize religious exemptions in the military by enlisting the help of
chaplains to interrogate servicemembers about their religious practices and
habits before considering religious exemption requests.366
Assuming the Marine can establish a sincere religious opposition to
abortion and the use of aborted fetuses in developing the vaccines, this
again would seem to be a substantial burden on religious exercise because
it “[r]equires participation in an activity prohibited by a sincerely held
religious belief” and “[p]laces substantial pressure on a Service member
to engage in conduct contrary to a sincerely held religious belief.”367 If
the Marine Corps attempts to avoid this by arguing that any burden is de
minimis because the production of the vaccine is too attenuated from the
issue of abortion, that argument would seem to fall under the Supreme
365
See Letter from Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin, Mandatory
Coronavirus Disease 2019 Vaccination of Department of Defense Service Members,
DEP’T
OF
DEF.
(Aug.
24,
2021),
https://media.defense.gov/2021/Aug/25/2002838826/-1/-1/0/MEMORANDUMFOR-MANDATORY-CORONAVIRUS-DISEASE-2019-VACCINATION-OFDEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-SERVICE-MEMBERS.PDF
[https://perma.cc/FM26-6ATN]; see also President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Executive
Order on Requiring Coronavirus Disease 2019 Vaccination for Federal Employees,
WHITE HOUSE
(Sept.
9,
2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/presidential-actions/2021/09/09/executive-order-on-requiring-coronavirusdisease-2019-vaccination-for-federal-employees/ [https://perma.cc/4VSS-7X3Y].
366
See, e.g., Ryan Morgan, Coast Guard to scrutinize members requesting
religious exemptions for mandatory COVID vaccine, leaked document reveals, AM.
MIL. NEWS (Sept. 24, 2021), https://americanmilitarynews.com/2021/09/coast-guardto-scrutinize-members-requesting-religious-exemptions-for-mandatory-covidvaccine-leaked-document-reveals/.
367
See DOD INSTRUCTION 1300.17, Religious Liberty in the Military Services,
para. G.2 (Sept. 1, 2020) (defining a “substantial burden”).
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Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby, which rejected a similar attenuation
argument as an improper judgment as to the reasonableness of the sincere
religious belief.368
Assuming that strict scrutiny would apply to this request – the
absence of DoD religious exemptions would be irrelevant considering the
existence of a superseding act of Congress, such as RFRA – the Marine
Corps would undoubtedly cite to data indicating the need for a vaccine to
slow the spread of the virus, the severe nature of the global pandemic, and
any other medical data available indicating that having a Covid-22 vaccine
would be critical for public health and the safety of military personnel. It
is likely that this would be seen as a compelling interest in general, but
RFRA would also require the Marine Corps to illustrate why the military
has a compelling interest in ensuring that this particular Marine must get
a vaccination. This would be a fact-specific inquiry, and it could be
complicated by other data, such as whether the Marine had natural
immunity to Covid-22 or had built up antibodies after surviving a bout of
Covid-22, himself. In addition, if the Marine Corps were also offering
medical exemptions, military leaders would need to explain why it was
necessary to vaccinate this Marine when other members could work with
an exemption.
Assuming the Marine Corps could establish a compelling interest to
vaccinate this particular Marine, the issue would then become whether
forcing the vaccination of this member is the least restrictive means of
protecting his fellow Marines. For instance, would a regimen of Covid22 testing, mask-wearing, social-distancing, isolation, and the like provide
a sufficient level of safety to satisfy the compelling Marine Corps interest
in the safety of those fellow Marines, or is it essential to actually vaccinate
this Marine (against his conscience)? A truly searching inquiry would
examine the medical and statistical evidence to determine whether the
vaccination requirement is sufficiently better than the alternative means to
achieve the asserted compelling interests.
In short, if the Marine Corps is serious about respecting RFRA, it
may need to find alternative ways to address these health issues to
accommodate the religious beliefs of its members. On the other hand, this
might be one of those situations where the Marine Corps is able to survive
strict scrutiny review and force the Marine to take the vaccination against
his conscience.

368
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 723–24 (2014)
(rejecting the argument); see also supra note 355 and accompanying text (discussing
the matter).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Religious service members are a critical part of the military fighting
force that is tasked to fight and win wars. In the 1990’s, Congress and the
President decided that the protections for religious liberty under the First
Amendment were not sufficiently strong in light of Supreme Court
constitutional interpretations, so they enacted the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) to remedy that problem.369 Although the Act
clearly applied to the U.S. Armed Forces, it took the DoD almost 30 years
to finally embrace it and be “born again” into the RFRA world created in
the 1990’s.370
This Article has detailed the importance of religious freedom in the
United States and its armed forces, as well as the unfortunate history of
non-accommodation that has plagued the military until recent years. It has
recounted the Supreme Court case law that led Congress to enact RFRA,
and it has outlined the military’s reticence in accepting RFRA as the new
standard in religious accommodation claims. Setting out an analysis for
handing religious accommodation claims under RFRA in the military, this
Article has proposed a series of hypotheticals that demonstrate the kinds
of issues the military will need to confront and accommodate if it is truly
able to respect its members’ religious liberty, as well as the spirit and letter
of RFRA.
The only question that remains is whether the DoD will backslide to
a time when it refused to accommodate religious exercise in a meaningful
way, or whether it will comply with the law and support the freedom of its
servicemembers. While not every issue will be easy to resolve, and some
will criticize certain religious accommodations, there is no reason why
religious freedom cannot be balanced with military efficiency, good order
and discipline, and respect for the rights of others – even those with whom
one disagrees. In sum, the DoD can and should respect the religious
practices of its members, as RFRA requires, and still remain true to recent
social change.
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